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EMPLOYEE STATUS AND THE CONCEPT
OF CONTROL IN FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Frank J. Menetrez*
The Supreme Court has held that the determination of whether a particu-
lar individual is an employee for purposes of federal antidiscrimination
law-often a dispositive issue in employment discrimination cases-is to be
governed by the common law of agency. In this Article, the author criti-
cally evaluates the federal case law concerning employee status determina-
tions and concludes that the entire body of law must be rethought. In
particular, the author focuses on the following three assumptions that per-
vade both the case law and previous scholarship on the subject: (1) Any
individual with sufficient ownership and control rights in a business must
be an employer; (2) an employer cannot be an employee; and (3) a partner
cannot be an employee. The author argues that, notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court's qualified endorsement of some of those assumptions, all
three of them are at odds with common law agency doctrine and conse-
quently must be rejected. The author's analysis shows that under a proper
application of the common law, the principal arguments advanced by em-
ployment discrimination defendants in this area turn out to be nonstarters.
As a result, many more individuals should be classified as employees than
previous case law and scholarship suggest.
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INTRODUCTIONCONSIDER this scenario: A female physician who is one of four
shareholders in a professional corporation sues the corporation
for gender discrimination in employment. Like the other three
shareholders, she owns stock in the corporation and participates in man-
aging it. Also like the other three shareholders, she works in the corpora-
tion's medical practice, providing medical services to patients on the
corporation's behalf.
In defending against the discrimination suit, the corporation argues
that because the plaintiff is an owner and a manager of the corporation,
she really plays the role of an employer. She therefore is not an em-
ployee, so she is not a proper plaintiff under federal employment discrim-
ination law. The corporation also advances the related argument that,
again because of her role as an owner and a manager, the plaintiff is in
substance more like a partner in a partnership than a shareholder in a
corporation, so she is not an employee.
Three premises lie at the heart of the defense arguments: (1) An indi-
vidual who owns and manages a business is an employer; (2) an individual
cannot be both an employer and an employee; and (3) an individual can-
not be both a partner and an employee. This Article argues that, evalu-
ated under familiar common law agency principles, the defense
arguments are unsound at every step.
First, an individual can own and manage a business without being the
employer of the business's workers.' Every corporate officer knows that,
and every corporate defense counsel knows it too. If a corporation's
chief executive officer is also both the chair of the corporation's board of
directors and a major shareholder, that person does not thereby become
the employer of the corporation's employees. Corporate counsel would
be the first to point that out if a tort plaintiff were ever foolish enough to
try to hold the chief executive officer liable in respondeat superior for a
corporate employee's torts. A corporate employee's employer is the cor-
poration, not its officers, directors, or shareholders. Thus, the fundamen-
tal error in the defense argument is that although employees are by
definition subject to their employers' right to control their physical con-
1. See infra Part III.A.
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duct,2 not every individual who has the right to control other individuals'
physical conduct is an employer. Supervisory employees routinely exer-
cise the right to control subordinate employees' physical conduct but do
not thereby become those employees' employers. The first premise of
the defense argument-that being an owner and a manager means being
an employer-is therefore false.
Second, if it were true that an individual who owns and manages a busi-
ness thereby becomes an employer, then it would follow that an individ-
ual can be both an employer and an employee at the same time.3 Again,
the reasons are uncontroversial. A factory worker who buys shares of his
corporate employer's stock does not thereby cease to be an employee of
the corporation. Rather, the worker is both an owner and an employee.
If the worker manages to secure a seat on the board of directors but still
does not quit the job in the factory, then the worker is an owner, a man-
ager, and an employee. Thus, if being an owner and a manager entailed
being an employer, then the factory worker would be both an employer
and an employee. Therefore, assuming the truth of the first premise of
the defense argument, the second premise must be false.
Third, no less an authority than the Restatement (Second) of Agency
states that, under certain easily satisfied conditions, partners can be em-
ployees of their own partnership.4 At common law, an employee is an
agent whose principal has the right to control the agent's physical con-
duct. 5 Partners are agents of their partnership, 6 and there is no reason
why the partnership cannot have an express or implied right to control
the partners' physical conduct in the performance of their work for the
partnership. Indeed, it would be surprising if a law firm, for example, did
not have an express or implied right to prohibit its partners from physi-
cally assaulting the firm's clients. Consequently, the final premise of the
defense arguments-that a partner cannot be an employee-is false as
well. To return to the original hypothetical, even if a physi-
cian-shareholder of a professional corporation is in some sense "really" a
partner, she could still be an employee.
Given the straightforward and dispositive defects in the defense argu-
ments, one might reasonably wonder why they are even worth discussing.
The answer is that every federal appellate court that has considered them,
including the United States Supreme Court in Clackamas Gastroenterol-
ogy Associates, P.C. v. Wells,7 has failed to notice their flaws. In case
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1)-(2) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
3. See infra Part III.B.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a; see infra Part III.C.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1)-(2) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
6. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 301(1) (amended 1997), 6(I) U.L.A. 101 (2001);
UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 9(1) (1914), 6(I) U.L.A. 553 (2001); 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 4.01(b) (2009); WILLIAM A.
GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 184, 194 (3d ed. 2001).
7. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
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after case the courts have assumed, with little or no discussion, that all
three premises of the defense arguments are true. For example, the fed-
eral courts have repeatedly assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that
partners cannot be employees, but no federal court has ever quoted or
referred to, let alone refuted, the Restatement's unequivocally contrary
conclusion.8
That failure has not been confined to the courts. There is no shortage
of secondary literature in this area, particularly on the subject of whether
and under what circumstances partners should be classified as employees
for purposes of antidiscrimination law. 9 Despite the high volume of
8. There is one state court case that, in a wholly unrelated context, cites the relevant
provision of the Restatement and acknowledges that "[a] single person or entity can" be
"simultaneously agent and principal." Stickel v. Harris, 242 Cal. Rptr. 88, 94 n.8 (Ct. App.
1987). For discussion of the multiple roles that a single individual can play within a single
business organization and the implications of such roles for determining partners' employ-
ment status, see infra Parts III.B and III.C.
9. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title Vii to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 945 (1982); Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, So, You Want to Be a Partner at
Sidley & Austin?, 40 Hous. L. REV. 969 (2003); Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee
Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1984); Stephanie
Greene & Christine Neylon O'Brien, Who Counts?: The United States Supreme Court Cites
"Control" as the Key to Distinguishing Employers from Employees Under Federal Employ-
ment Antidiscrimination Laws, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 761; Daniel S. Kleinberger,
"Magnificent Circularity" and the Churkendoose: LLC Members and Federal Employment
Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 477 (1997); Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond
"Economic Realities": The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws
to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239 (1997); Ann C. McGinley, Func-
tionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as "Employees" Under the Anti-Discrim-
ination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3 (2004); Charles W. Newcom, Hishon v. King & Spalding:
Discrimination in Professional Partnerships, 62 DENv. U. L. REV. 485 (1985); Lauren Win-
ters, Partners Without Power: Protecting Law Firm Partners from Discrimination, 39 U.S.F.
L. REV. 413 (2005); Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to the
Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MicH. L. REV. 282 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Applicability of
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation]; Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Reme-
dies, 94 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Tenure and Partnership]; Joel Bannis-
ter, Comment, In Search of a Title: When Should Partners Be Considered "Employees" for
Purposes of Federal Employment Antidiscrimination Statutes?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 257
(2004); Judith Bartnoff, Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level"
Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1614 (1973); Darren M. Creasy, Note, A Union of Formalism and
Flexibility: Allowing Employers to Set Their Own Liability Under Federal Employment Dis-
crimination Laws, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1453 (2003); Rod Doty, Note, The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act and Mandatory Retirement of Law Firm Partners, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1679 (1980); Troy D. Ferguson, Comment, Partners as Employees Under the
Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes: Are the Roles of Partner and Employee Mutu-
ally Exclusive?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 699 (1988); Alan Ross Haguewood, Note, Gray
Power in the Gray Area Between Employer and Employee: The Applicability of the ADEA
to Members of Limited Liability Companies, 51 VAND. L. REV. 429 (1998); Jeffrey D.
Horst, Note, The Application of Title VII to Law Firm Partnership Decisions: Women
Struggle to Join the Club, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 841 (1983); Kristin Nicole Johnson, Note,
Resolving the Title VII Partner-Employee Debate, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1067 (2003); Cathe-
rine Lovly & Matthew J. Mehnert, Note, Something Every Lawyer Needs to Know: The
Employer-Employee Distinction in the Modern Law Firm, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
663 (2004); Rebecca R. Luchok, Comment, Coming of Age in the Professional Corpora-
tion: Liability of Professional Corporations for Dismissal of Members Under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1185 (1987); Arthur J. Marziale, Jr.,
Note, Hishon v. King & Spalding: Implications for the Private Partnership, 14 CAP. U. L.
REV. 151 (1984); Rachel M. Milazzo, Note, Circular Definitions of What Constitutes an
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scholarly activity, however, the misguided premises urged by the employ-
ment defense bar have gone virtually unchallenged. One commentator
after another has assumed, with the courts, that an individual with a suffi-
cient amount of ownership and control must be an employer, that an em-
ployer cannot be an employee, and that a partner cannot be an employee.
In general, the secondary literature has taken for granted that applying
common law doctrine would be unfavorable to employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs, and commentators have consequently advocated various
means of getting around that perceived problem. The literature's ap-
proach to the employment status of partners illustrates the point. Schol-
ars have contended that in order to classify an individual with the title of
"partner" as an employee, courts would need to (1) find that the title is
empty because the individual is not in substance a partner,'0 or (2) find
that the partner possesses insufficient managerial power within the part-
nership to be shielded against discrimination," or (3) apply an "economic
realities" test (rather than the common law of agency) to determine em-
ployee status,12 or (4) adopt the "entity theory" (rather than the "aggre-
gate theory") of partnerships,' 3 or (5) broadly interpret the term
"employee" to further the remedial purposes of the antidiscrimination
Employee: Determining Whether the Partners of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood Qualify as
Employers or Employees Under Federal Law, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1329 (2007); John
Narducci, Note, The Application of Antidiscrimination Statutes to Shareholders of Profes-
sional Corporations: Forcing Fellow Shareholders Out of the Club, 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
839 (1987); Leigh Pokora, Comment, Partners as Employees Under Title VII: The Saga
Continues: A Comment on the State of the Law, 22 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 249 (1995); Peter J.
Prettyman, Note, How to Discriminate Against Old Lawyers: The Status of Partners, Share-
holders, and Members Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act with Addendum
Discussing Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 37 IND. L. REV. 545
(2004); Colleen M. Raker, Note, Employment Discrimination: EEOC Subpoena Enforce-
ment to Determine ADEA Coverage of Partnership Retirement Policy-EEOC v. Peat
Marwick Mitchell & Co., 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 967 (1986); David A. Rappaport, Note, A
Coming of Age?: Why Revised EEOC Guidelines May Force Firms to Protect Against Part-
ner Age Discrimination Suits, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1013 (2002); Dawn S. Sherman,
Note, Partners Suing the Partnership: Are Courts Correctly Deciding Who Is an Employer
and Who Is an Employee Under Title VII?, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 645 (2000);
David R. Stras, Comment, An Invitation to Discrimination: How Congress and the Courts
Leave Most Partners and Shareholders Unprotected from Discriminatory Employment
Practices, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 239 (1998); Andrea Zelman, Comment, Civil Rights: Law
Partners as Employees for Title VII Purposes?, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 201 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Doty, supra note 9, at 1685; Greene & O'Brien, supra note 9, at 787-89;
Prettyman, supra note 9, at 555-56; Raker, supra note 9, at 983-84.
11. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 9, at 722 (stating that a partner may be classified as
an employee "if the circumstances of the work relationship demonstrate that protection is
required"); Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 9, at 708-09; McGinley, supra note 9, at 6, 55;
Milazzo, supra note 9, at 1331, 1354; Prettyman, supra note 9, at 572-75; Stras, supra note 9,
at 267-69.
12. See, e.g., Bierman & Gely, supra note 9, at 992-93; Doty, supra note 9, at 1688-90;
Ferguson, supra note 9, at 722-23; Horst, supra note 9, at 855-56; Raker, supra note 9, at
987. For discussion of the economic realities test, see infra Part I.B.
13. See, e.g., Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation, supra note
9, at 286-90; Note, Tenure and Partnership, supra note 9, at 462; Bannister, supra note 9, at
263; Doty, supra note 9, at 1684-88; Horst, supra note 9, at 854-55; McGinley, supra note 9,




In contrast, this Article argues (in accord with the Restatement) that
under the common law of agency a bona fide partner can be and often is
an employee regardless of the amount of managerial power the partner
possesses, regardless of any conflict between the entity theory and the
aggregate theory, and independently of any appeal to statutory purpose.
The scholarly consensus is therefore mistaken-there is no need for pol-
icy-driven or result-oriented attempts to evade a presumptively hostile
common law. Rather, careful attention to common law doctrine turns out
to be plaintiffs' strongest ally. Plaintiffs accordingly have nothing to fear
from the Supreme Court's holding in Clackamas that, for purposes of fed-
eral employment discrimination law, determinations of employee status
are to be governed by common law principles.15
In this way, notwithstanding courts' and commentators' unanimous
failure to recognize the defects in the defense arguments, the Supreme
Court in Clackamas has provided plaintiffs with the doctrinal equipment
necessary to refute those arguments in the future. Because the defense
arguments are inconsistent with common law principles, Clackamas re-
quires that the arguments be rejected.16
This Article traces the development of the case law that led to the
Clackamas decision and argues that the entire body of law must now be
fundamentally rethought. Part I begins by describing the definitions of
the terms "employee" and "employer" contained in the major federal
employment discrimination statutes, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), 17 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),1s
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 19 Part
I then proceeds to discuss the pre-Clackamas case law, focusing on the
assumptions that an employer cannot be an employee and that a partner
cannot be an employee. Part II analyzes the Clackamas decision itself,
with particular attention to its handling of the premises underlying the
defense arguments. Part II also looks at the post-Clackamas case law and
shows that, far from bringing conceptual clarity to this area of the law,
Clackamas has so far merely added to the confusion. Finally, Part III
argues that the Supreme Court's holding that the statutory term "em-
ployee" must be interpreted in terms of common law agency principles
14. See, e.g., Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation, supra note
9, at 290; Doty, supra note 9, at 1689-94; Ferguson, supra note 9, at 722-24; Horst, supra
note 9, at 855-57; Johnson, supra note 9, at 1098-1100. Only one commentator has noticed
the Restatement's determination that partners can be employees, and even that scholar
mentioned it only in passing and without recognizing its broad significance or exploring its
relationship to well-established common law principles. See Winters, supra note 9, at 421,
433.
15. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445, 448
(2003); see also infra note 119. Part IL.A, infra, discusses the scope of Clackamas's holding
in detail.
16. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445, 448.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
18. Id. §§ 12101-12213.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
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carries the potential to effect a basic reorientation in determinations of
employee status under federal employment discrimination law. Once
that potential is realized, employee status determinations will rest on a
rational and doctrinally sound footing, many more individuals will be
classified as employees than under prior case law, and many of the cases
that courts have found so complex will become easy.
Determinations of the employee status of equity holders or high-level
workers can be a dispositive issue in employment discrimination litiga-
tion-such determinations can extinguish plaintiffs' rights to redress re-
gardless of how meritorious their discrimination claims might otherwise
be.2 0 As long as partners are not considered employees for purposes of
employment discrimination law, professionals who are members of pro-
tected classes will be forced to choose between joining the elite ranks of
their professions, on the one hand, and retaining their rights against
workplace discrimination, on the other. Indeed, as long as courts believe
that anyone with substantial ownership and control rights must therefore
be an employer and not an employee, the same dynamic will prevail-
members of protected classes must either forgo advancement to the level
of owners and managers or else become fair game for discriminatory
treatment. To date, the federal courts' less-than-rigorous analysis of the
employment defense bar's arguments has generated precisely that di-
lemma, but the analysis presented in this Article shows that no such result
is necessary. Members of protected classes can succeed to the point of
becoming partners or owner-managers while still retaining their rights
under antidiscrimination law.
I. HOW SHOULD EMPLOYEE STATUS BE DETERMINED?
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA prohibit employers from engaging
in certain discriminatory practices toward employees. Title VII, for ex-
ample, makes it unlawful for "an employer" to "limit, segregate, or clas-
sify his employees" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin if the classification would adversely affect an individual's "status as
an employee." 21 Similarly, the ADEA prohibits "an employer" from
classifying "employees" on the basis of age,22 and the ADA likewise pro-
hibits an "employer" from classifying an "employee" on the basis of disa-
bility.23 Each of the three statutes provides for a civil action against an
"employer" who engages in unlawful discrimination.24 Thus, the scope of
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2006).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2006).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2006) (defining "covered entity" to include "an employer");
id. § 12112(a)-(b) (prohibiting a "covered entity" from adversely classifying an "employee"
on the basis of disability).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) (providing that the ADEA incorporates the enforce-
ment provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)); id. § 216(b) (providing for a
civil suit against an "employer" under the FLSA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f) (2006) (pro-
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the protection provided by federal employment discrimination law is cir-
cumscribed, in these and other ways, by the definitions of the statutory
terms "employer" and "employee."25
Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, Title VII defines an
"employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person." 26
Because the statute defines "employer" in terms of having "employees,"
the definition is meaningful only if "employee" is independently defined.
But, again subject to certain exceptions, Title VII defines an "employee"
as "an individual employed by an employer."27 Thus, each definition de-
pends entirely on the other, amply bearing out the Supreme Court's
often-repeated observation that the statutory definition of "employee"
"is completely circular and explains nothing."28
The ADA's definitions of "employer" and "employee" are identical to
Title VII's in all relevant respects.29 The ADEA's definitions are like-
wise relevantly identical, except that under the ADEA an employer must
have a minimum of twenty employees, as opposed to fifteen under Title
VII and the ADA.30
As the statutory definitions show, determinations of employee status
can play two distinct roles in the litigation of federal employment discrim-
viding for a civil suit against an "employer" under Title VII); id. § 12117(a) (providing that
the ADA incorporates the enforcement provisions of Title VII).
25. Both the ADEA and Title VII make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
(on specified grounds) against an "individual" in hiring, firing, or terms of employment.
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Neither
statute defines the term "individual," but case law holds that the term refers to employees
or applicants for employment. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345
F.3d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing the term "individual" in relation to Title VII
and the ADEA); Mangram v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 61, 62 (4th Cir. 1997) (referring
to an "individual" in the context of the ADEA). The ADA makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate against a "qualified individual on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (2006). Such an individual is defined as "an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment posi-
tion that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). Thus, the limitation to employ-
ees or applicants for employment is expressly built into the statute by the phrase
"employment position that such individual holds or desires."
The centrality of the terms "employer" and "employee" in the statutory schemes does
not, of course, mean that the employment-related protections of the statutes are absolutely
limited to discriminatory conduct by employers against employees. On the one hand, as
already noted, the statutes prohibit discrimination not only against employees but also
against applicants for employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (2006); id. § 12112(a). On the other hand, the statutes also prohibit discrimination
by entities other than employers. See, e.g., id. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a) (providing that the
ADA prohibits discrimination by any "covered entity," which includes not only employers
but also any "employment agency, labor organization, [or] joint labor-management com-
mittee"); id. §§ 2000e(n), 2000e-3(b) (providing that Title VII prohibits various forms of
discrimination by "labor organization [s]" and "employment agenc[ies]").
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
27. Id. § 2000e(f).
28. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (referring to an
identical definition in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4), (5) (2006).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), (f) (2006).
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ination claims. First, an individual who is not an employee is not a proper
plaintiff under the statutes (unless the individual is covered in some other
way, such as being an applicant for employment). Second, a defendant
must have the required minimum number of employees in order to be
classified as an employer under the statutes, so the determination of
whether a given defendant is a statutory employer will itself depend on a
determination of whether the defendant has the requisite number of stat-
utory employees.
Before Clackamas, the issue of how to determine employee status had
been extensively litigated in both contexts.3 ' Some scholars and plaintiffs
have proposed that different tests should be used in the two contexts, one
for determining proper plaintiffs and another for determining proper de-
fendants. 32 No court has ever adopted that approach, however, and after
Clackamas it no longer appears to be a viable proposal.33
One further feature of the statutory definitions merits brief discussion.
As already noted, the statutory definitions of "employer" all include "any
agent of such a person," 34 so the definitions literally mean that every
agent of an employer is also an employer for purposes of the statutes.
One scholar has argued on that basis that an individual can simultane-
ously be an employee and an employer for purposes of the statutes and,
therefore, that an individual's status as an employer does not imply that
the individual is not an employee, so defense arguments of the kind out-
lined in the Introduction cannot be sound.35
Examination of the case law, however, reveals that the "any agent of
such a person" language holds no such significance. Nine of the federal
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See Drescher v. Shatkin, 280 F.3d 201, 204-05 (2d Cir. 2002); Bierman & Gely,
supra note 9, at 992-93, 999-1000; Greene & O'Brien, supra note 9, at 792-93 (noting that
"courts have generally treated" the two types of cases "in the same manner," although
"some plaintiffs have argued" that they should be treated differently); Winters, supra note
9, at 447.
33. In Clackamas, the Supreme Court noted that the issue of employee status "comes
into play" in determining both proper plaintiffs and proper defendants. Clackamas Gas-
troenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 n.6 (2003). On that basis, the Court
reasoned that "a broad reading of the term 'employee' would . . . tend to expand the
coverage of the ADA by enlarging the number of employees entitled to protection and by
reducing the number of firms entitled to exemption." Id. Although it would probably be a
stretch to characterize these remarks as part of the Court's holding, they do strongly indi-
cate that, in the Court's view, the term "employee" should be interpreted uniformly in
both contexts. See Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that in Clack-
amas the Supreme Court "made clear that its test would determine whether someone was
an employee both for purposes of the fifteen-employe[e] threshold and in deciding
whether a plaintiff could bring a claim").
34. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006); id. § 12111(5).
35. McGinley, supra note 9, at 33-35. Under common law principles of agency, every
employee is an agent. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958); see also id.
cmt. a ("A master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent."). Thus, if
every agent is an employer, as the statutory definitions literally provide, then every em-
ployee would also be an employer. The statutory term "agent," however, has not been
interpreted to include all employees but, rather, has been limited to individuals who hold
supervisory positions and exercise significant control over hiring, firing, or conditions of
employment. See Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997).
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circuit courts of appeals have held that the inclusion of "any agent of such
a person" in the definitions of "employer" was intended only to subject
employers to respondeat superior liability for the discriminatory conduct
of their agents-it does not make the agents themselves individually lia-
ble for discrimination, as they would be if they were truly employers for
purposes of the statutes. 36 A powerful argument in favor of that interpre-
tation is that the only remedies provided under Title VII as originally
enacted were reinstatement and back pay, which by their nature could be
awarded only against the plaintiff's true employer and not against a mere
agent or coemployee.37 It follows that Congress could not have intended
to make every agent an employer for purposes of the statute, thereby
subjecting all agents to liability for remedies that they were patently inca-
pable of providing.
If the widely accepted interpretation of the "any agent of such a per-
son" provision in the statutory definitions is correct, as it appears to be,
then notwithstanding its plain language, the provision does not show that
an individual can simultaneously be both an employer and an employee
for purposes of federal antidiscrimination law. The provision therefore
leaves untouched the defense arguments described in the Introduction.38
36. Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006); Wathen, 115 F.3d at 404-06;
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-16 (2d Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391,
1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-81 (7th
Cir. 1995); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1995); Grant
v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d
583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993);
see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII, the ADA, and the
ADEA all provide for civil suits against employers who engage in unlawful
discrimination).
37. See Wathen, 115 F.3d at 406. In 1991, Congress amended the statute to include
additional remedies, but even those new remedies are scaled "to the size of the employer,
beginning with employers having at least fifteen employees." Id. Thus, even the new re-
medial provision would be applicable only to true employers who have the minimum num-
ber of employees, not to individuals who are employers merely by being the agents of such
employers. Id. ("The statute contains no provision for damages to be paid by individuals,
further evidencing a lack of congressional intent to hold individuals liable.").
38. It is worth noting that the definitions in Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA differ
in an important respect from the definitions in the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). The
FLSA defines "employer" as "includ[ing] any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer," a definition that seems even more unhelpful than those used in
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Id. § 203(d). The FLSA's definition of "employee"
is, in relevant part, identical to those used in the employment discrimination statutes: "any
individual employed by an employer." Id. § 203(e)(1). Unlike the antidiscrimination stat-
utes, however, the FLSA includes the following additional definition: "'Employ' includes
to suffer or permit to work." Id. § 203(g).
Because the FLSA provides an independent definition of "employ," the statute's defini-
tion of "employee" is not circular. Rather, under the FLSA an employee is any individual
whom an employer suffers or permits to work. Although the phrase "suffer or permit to
work" seems relatively opaque on the surface, it has an established and extremely broad
meaning that derives from its origins in nineteenth-century child labor statutes. See Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992); Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 n.7 (1947). See generally Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair
Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Defini-
tion of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REv. 983, 1030-1103 (1999). Roughly speaking, an em-
ployer suffers or permits an individual to work if the employer has both "the means to
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know of the work and the power to prevent it," regardless of whether the employer and
the individual have a traditional employment relationship, and even if the employer has no
actual knowledge that the individual is doing any work at all. Id. at 1043. For example, if a
farm owner retains an independent contractor whose employees work on the farm, then
the owner "suffers or permits" the work of the contractor's employees-and thus becomes
an employer of those employees for purposes of the FLSA-even though the owner has no
direct contractual relationship with the employees and might have no idea who they are or
what they do. Cf. Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (observing that the FLSA's scheme "sweeps in almost any
work done on the employer's premises, potentially any work done for the employer's bene-
fit or with the employer's acquiescence" and was "designed to defeat rather than imple-
ment contractual arrangements"). But as Goldstein et al., supra, documents, federal courts
applying the FLSA have been regrettably heedless of the "suffer or permit" language and
its well-established meaning, despite the Supreme Court's recognition as early as 1947 that
the language "derives from the child labor statutes." Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at
728; see Goldstein et al., supra, at 1103-36.
The relationship between the definitional scheme used in the FLSA and those used in
the antidiscrimination statutes is not straightforward. On the one hand, the absence of the
"suffer or permit" language (or any other definition of "employ") in the antidiscrimination
statutes could be taken to show that the meaning of "employee" under those statutes can-
not be the same as the meaning of "employee" under the FLSA. On the other hand, the
legislative history of Title VII states that "employee" is "defined for the purposes of the
title in the manner common for Federal statutes." H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2402. That statement could be taken as a sign that Congress
intended "employee" to mean the same thing in both Title VII and the FLSA, notwith-
standing the former statutes' omission of the "suffer or permit" language. Cf. Wheeler v.
Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 268 n.24 (10th Cir. 1987); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology
Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated by Clackamas Gastroenterol-
ogy Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 443 (2003); Dowd, supra note 9, at 89-95 (arguing
that Congress intended the definition of "employee" in Title VII to have the same scope as
the definition in the FLSA). Insofar as the definitions of "employee" in the ADA and the
ADEA were modeled on the definition in Title VII, a similar argument could be made
with respect to those statutes as well. Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)
("[T]he prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.").
Had the courts taken such an approach, many of the difficulties in applying the antidis-
crimination statutes to particular employment contexts would have disappeared. A law
partnership, for example, undeniably suffers or permits its partners to work-they provide
legal advice and representation, which is the service that the firm sells-so the partners
would be employees for purposes of the antidiscrimination statutes if "employ" and hence
"employee" were interpreted in keeping with the FLSA definition. The same analysis
would apply to the shareholders of a professional corporation: As long as they are engaged
in providing professional services on behalf of the corporation, they are the corporation's
employees because the corporation is suffering or permitting them to work.
Whatever the merits of that approach, however, it is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's
decision in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). In that case,
the Court acknowledged that both the FLSA and ERISA define "employee" to include
"any individual employed by an employer," but the Court also recognized that the FLSA
contains, and ERISA lacks, a definition of "employ" that "stretches the meaning of 'em-
ployee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of
traditional agency law principles." Id. at 326. The Court therefore concluded that "the
textual asymmetry between the two statutes precludes reliance on FLSA cases when con-
struing ERISA's concept of 'employee."' Id,
The Supreme Court's determination that the term "employee" has a different meaning
under the FLSA from its meaning under ERISA should apply with equal force to Title VII,
the ADA, and the ADEA. Consequently, if a defendant suffers or permits a plaintiff to




B. THE PRE-CLACKAMAS CASE LAW
The federal judiciary's pre-Clackamas attempts to determine who
counts as an employee for purposes of federal employment discrimina-
tion law failed to produce a consensus concerning the appropriate test for
employee status. Some cases adopted the so-called common law test, fo-
cusing on certain factors originating in the common law of agency, with
particular emphasis on the employer's right to control the manner and
means of the putative employee's work.39 Others determined employee
status on the basis of an "economic realities test" derived from Fair Labor
Standards Act case law, which aims to discern whether the alleged em-
ployee "is economically dependent upon the principal or is instead in bus-
iness for himself."40 And still others used a "hybrid test" that combined
the common law test with the economic realities test.41
It is not clear whether there were ever more than nominal differences
between those three tests,42 all of which required courts to balance an
indeterminate number of factors drawn from the common law of agency,
including the thirteen factors that the Supreme Court listed in Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid43 and reiterated in Nationwide Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Darden.44 Moreover, the cases themselves do not
use the labels-"common law test," "economic realities test," and "hy-
brid test"-consistently, making a uniform taxonomy of the case law ex-
tremely difficult.45
Rather than attempt a fresh synthesis of the (largely superseded) pre-
Clackamas judicial decisions, this Article discusses some of the cases that
dealt with the specific issue the Supreme Court decided in Clackamas,
namely, how to determine whether a shareholder of a professional corpo-
39. See, e.g., Farlow v. Wachovia Bank, 259 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2001); Eisenberg v.
Advance Relocation & Storage of Conn., Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2000); Barn-
hart v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1998); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc.,
673 F.2d 337, 340-41 (11th Cir. 1982).
40. Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Broussard v. L.H.
Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d
1177, 1178 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1984); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332,1340 (6th Cir. 1983),
abrogated by Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503-04 (2006).
41. See, e.g., Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 480, 483-84 (8th Cir.
2000) (applying the "common-law approach" while also weighing "the 'economic realities'
of the worker's situation"); Oestman v. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305
(10th Cir. 1992) (applying "the hybrid test," which combines "the economic realities test
and the common law right to control test"); Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
950 F.2d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983);
Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
42. See Maltby & Yamada, supra note 9, at 254 (arguing that "the tests are largely the
same").
43. 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
44. 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992).
45. Compare Broussard, 789 F.2d at 1160 (citing Spirides, 613 F.2d 826, as authority
for the economic realities test) and Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir.
1982) (similar) with Zippo, 713 F.2d at 37 (citing Spirides as authority for the hybrid test)
and Oestman, 958 F.2d at 305 (same); see also Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs.,
P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Spirides as authority for the economic realities
test and Zippo as authority for the hybrid test), abrogated by Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 443.
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ration is an employee for purposes of employment discrimination law.
The discussion also focuses on some of the decisions that relied explicitly
or implicitly on the assumption that a single individual cannot be both an
employer and an employee and the related assumption that a bona fide
partner cannot be an employee of the partnership.
1. The Circuit Split
The primary issue before the Supreme Court in Clackamas was a cir-
cuit split that originated in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.4 6 The issue in
that case was whether the defendant entity, an Illinois professional corpo-
ration, was an employer for purposes of Title VII.4 7 It was undisputed
that unless the defendant's three shareholders counted as employees, the
defendant had fewer than the statutory minimum of fifteen employees
and therefore was not an employer. 4 8 The district court determined that
the shareholders were not employees, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 4 9
The Seventh Circuit stated that, although the defendant was a profes-
sional corporation and not a partnership, "this distinction is of little value
to Title VII purposes."5 0 The court reasoned that as a matter of "eco-
nomic reality," "[tihe role of a shareholder in a professional corporation
is far more analogous to a partner in a partnership than it is to the share-
holder of a general corporation." 5 ' The court thus concluded that be-
cause partners are not employees of their own partnership, the
shareholders of the defendant professional corporation were not employ-
ees either.5 2
In Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, the Second Circuit re-
jected the Seventh Circuit's approach.5 3 In Hyland, the plaintiff alleged
that he had been forced out of the defendant professional corporation
because of his age, and he brought suit under the ADEA. 54 The defen-
dant successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
plaintiff, as a shareholder of the professional corporation, "should be
considered a partner and not an employee" for purposes of the ADEA.55
46. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 1177-78.
48. Id. at 1178.
49. Id. at 1177.
50. Id. at 1178.
51. Id.
52. Id. In a subsequent case, the Seventh Circuit clarified that Dowd & Dowd did not
hold that shareholders of a professional corporation are never employees. See Schmidt v.
Ottawa Med. Ctr., 322 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 2003) ("We will not, therefore, interpret
Dowd to require us always to treat shareholders in Illinois professional corporations as
employers; such a result would stand Dowd on its head, favoring, in the end, labels over
realities."). Rather, the court explained that the status of a professional corporation's
shareholders must be determined on the basis of a case-by-case evaluation of the economic
realities of their relationship with the firm. Id. at 464-66.
53. 794 F.2d 793, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated by Clackamas Gastroenterology As-
socs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 443 (2003).
54. Id. at 794.
55. Id. at 795.
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The Second Circuit disagreed. 56 The court acknowledged Dowd &
Dowd's contrary holding and recognized that shareholders of profes-
sional corporations "have many of the attributes of partners" and, con-
versely, that "partnerships frequently are organized in the manner of
corporations."5 7 Nonetheless, the court saw "no reason for ignoring a
form of business organization freely chosen and established."5 8 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the defendant's "use of the corporate form
precludes any examination designed to determine whether the entity is in
fact a partnership."5 9 That is, an alleged employer that has voluntarily
adopted a form of business organization other than a partnership and has
reaped the benefits of the chosen form will not be heard to argue that the
business should be treated as a partnership for purposes of antidis-
crimination law.6 0
Five years later, in another ADEA case involving a professional corpo-
ration, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit and disparaged
the Second Circuit's "exaltation of form over substance." 61 The Eighth
Circuit followed suit in Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, a Title VII
case.62 When the Ninth Circuit sided with the Second Circuit a few years
later, holding that physician-shareholders in a professional corporation
are employees for purposes of federal antidiscrimination law, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.6 3
2. The Partner-Employee Dichotomy
Although the courts in Dowd & Dowd and Hyland disagreed about
whether a defendant's adoption of the corporate form precluded the de-
fendant from seeking to be treated as a partnership, both courts took for
granted that partners are not employees of their own partnership.64 The
only point of conflict between the two cases was whether shareholders of
a professional corporation should be treated as partners. 65 But if they
were to be treated as partners, then under both Dowd & Dowd and Hy-
56. Id. at 797-98.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 798 ("[A]ny inquiry respecting partnership status would be irrelevant.").
60. Id. at 798 & n.5 (noting that incorporation gave the defendant "important tax ad-
vantages and employee benefits not available in any other type of business organization"
and observing that by retaining those benefits and still seeking to be treated as a partner-
ship for purposes of antidiscrimination law, the defendant was trying "to secure the 'best of
both possible worlds"').
61. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir. 1991).
62. Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 79, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1996).
63. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442-44
(2003).
64. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797 ("It is generally accepted that the benefits of the antidis-
crimination statutes .. . do not extend to those who properly are classified as partners."),
abrogated by Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 443; EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177,
1178 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e do not see how partners can be regarded as employees rather
than as employers who own and manage the operation of the business.") (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
65. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797; Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
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land it was a foregone conclusion that they could not be treated as
employees.
That rigid dichotomy between partners and employees is ubiquitous in
the federal appellate case law6 6 and originated in a previous Seventh Cir-
cuit decision, Burke v. Friedman.67 In Burke, the defendant was a part-
nership, not a professional corporation, but the issue again was whether
the defendant's owners (its partners) were employees; without them, the
defendant lacked the minimum number of employees to count as an em-
ployer under Title VII.68 The court concluded that the partners were not
employees of the partnership, but the opinion contains virtually no analy-
sis in support of that conclusion. 69 After noting some of the general fea-
tures of partnerships, the court observed that "[p]artners manage and
control the business and share in the profits and losses," and the court
consequently did not "see how partners can be regarded as employees
rather than as employers who own and manage the operation of the
business." o
The court's description of partners-they "manage and control the bus-
iness and share in the profits and losses" 71-applies equally well to execu-
tives of an ordinary corporation who also own the corporation's stock.
(An executive manages and controls the business, and a shareholder
shares in the profits and losses through both fluctuations in the stock
price and the payment of dividends.) 72 But the court said nothing to rec-
oncile its conclusion-partners are employers and are not employees-
with the uncontroversial facts that (1) a shareholder-executive of an ordi-
nary corporation is not an employer of the corporation's workers,73 and
(2) such an executive often is an employee of the corporation. 74
When the Seventh Circuit decided Dowd & Dowd, Burke was binding
precedent within the circuit, so the court followed Burke's part-
ner-employee dichotomy with almost no discussion.75 The Second Cir-
cuit, although not bound by Burke, likewise uncritically adopted the
partner-employee dichotomy, adding only that the dichotomy is limited
to individuals "who properly are classified as partners" and thus does not
66. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2002);
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1997); Devine, 100 F.3d at 80-81;
Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996); Strother v. S. Cal.
Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 1996); Fountain, 925 F.2d at 1400;
Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277 (10th Cir. 1987); Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797;
Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Kleinberger, supra note 9, at
520 ("The case law is consistent on at least one point. A genuine partner, whatever that
may be, cannot be an employee for federal employment law purposes.").
67. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 868-69.
69. Id. at 869.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5717 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009); 2 id. § 495 (rev. vol. 2006).
73. See infra Part III.A.
74. See, e.g., infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
75. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984).
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apply to individuals who are partners in name only; "'an employer may
not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as
"partners.""' 7 6 The Sixth Circuit later took the same route, adopting the
partner-employee dichotomy without even attempting to state a basis for
it.77
Two cases that contain more extensive discussion of the dichotomy are
Wheeler v. Main Hurdman78 and EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood.79 The issue in both cases was the reverse of the issue in Dowd &
Dowd and Hyland, which sought to determine whether an individual who
had been labeled an "employee" was really a partner.80 In contrast,
Wheeler and Sidley Austin, like Burke, sought to determine whether an
individual who had been labeled a "partner" was really an employee.8'
Regrettably, the analysis in both cases is no more illuminating than the
discussion in Dowd & Dowd and Hyland.
In Wheeler, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant accounting firm had
discriminated against her on the basis of her age and sex; the firm claimed
that before her termination the plaintiff was a partner in the firm rather
than an employee, so she was not protected by antidiscrimination law. 8 2
The court surveyed a broad array of sources (including case law, agency
opinions, and scholarship) and ultimately concluded that "bona fide gen-
eral partners are not employees under" federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes.83 The court's opinion, however, contains no identifiable
basis for that conclusion. Indeed, the court's categorical determination
that bona fide partners are not employees runs counter to the court's own
concession that "categorical absolutes are difficult to sustain in this
area." 84 The court also observed that "opportunity for profit and loss"
and "investment in the business" are "fundamental" characteristics of
partners but are "regarded as inconsistent with employee status."85 Like
the Seventh Circuit in Burke, however, the court failed to note that those
characteristics are shared by corporate shareholder-executives, who in-
disputably can be corporate employees.86
76. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986) (quot-
ing Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 n.2 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)), abro-
gated by Clackamas, 538 U.S. 440,443 (2003). Every court to have considered the question
agrees with that qualification of the partner-employee dichotomy-no court has held that
individuals who are partners in name only cannot be employees. See infra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text; see also Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 520. Consequently, this Article
generally uses the term "partners" to mean "bona fide partners" or "partners in sub-
stance," rather than "individuals who have been given the label or title 'partner."'
77. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 1996) (observing that
"bona fide ... partners are employers, not employees").
78. 825 F.2d 257, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1987).
79. 315 F.3d 696, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2002).
80. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797; Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
81. Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 698; Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 258.
82. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 258.
83. Id. at 277; see also id. at 263-77.
84. Id. at 268.
85. Id. at 275.
86. See infra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
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Sidley Austin is no better. The case concerned an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigation of a law firm's allegedly
discriminatory demotion of thirty-two individuals.87 The EEOC at-
tempted to subpoena the firm's records as part of its investigation, and
the firm resisted the subpoena on the ground that the thirty-two individu-
als were bona fide partners and thus were not protected by antidis-
crimination law.8 8 The Seventh Circuit enforced the subpoena,89 but the
court's analysis is virtually impossible to follow. The court initially as-
serted that because "[e]mployers are not protected" by federal antidis-
crimination law, the issue was whether the thirty-two individuals were
employers.90 The court stated that the individuals were partners ("They
are, or rather were [before their demotion], partners"), but the court
inexplicably went on to investigate whether or not they were partners,
attempting to identify which "partneresque" feature of the individuals'
relationship to the firm might be "enough to pin the partner tail on the
donkey."91 Having failed to resolve that issue, the court reiterated that
"the issue is not whether the 32 before their demotion were partners,"
but rather "whether they were employers." 92 As for the part-
ner-employee dichotomy, the court said that although the individuals
were partners, "it does not follow that they were employers."93 But at
the same time, the court also cited Burke, which was binding precedent
within the circuit, as holding that "partners were employers for purposes
of Title VII."94 For all of these reasons, the majority opinion in Sidley
Austin provides neither an unambiguous endorsement (or rejection) of
the partner-employee dichotomy nor any intelligible rationale for it. The
concurring opinion of Judge Easterbrook, in slight contrast, does un-
equivocally endorse the dichotomy but still leaves its basis unstated.95
One final point concerning the scholarship on this issue merits brief
mention. A number of commentators have claimed that the case law
manifests a split between courts that have adopted a "per se rule" con-
cerning the employee status of partners and those that apply an economic
87. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2002).
88. Id. at 698-99.
89. Id. at 707.
90. Id. at 702. Because the antidiscrimination statutes protect employees, the court's
reasoning-that the thirty-two individuals were not protected if they were employers-
presupposes that an individual cannot be both an employer and an employee. The case
law developing that presupposition (i.e., the employer-employee dichotomy) will be dis-
cussed separately in Part I.B.3, infra.
91. Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 702-03.
92. Id. at 704. Again, the court's reasoning makes sense only if it presupposes the
employer-employee dichotomy.
93. Id. at 702.
94. Id. at 706.
95. Id. at 709 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("No one believes that a bona fide partner
is in a master-servant relation with the partnership, or that the partner 'is employed by'
the partnership."). When Judge Easterbrook said "No one," he might more accurately




realities test, or something similar.96 There is in fact no such split. The
only per se rule that the courts have adopted is the rule that partners
cannot be employees. Every court that has reached the question has
adopted that rule, and every court that has considered whether the rule
should be limited to bona fide partners has so limited it.97 The courts'
treatment of the issue has therefore been perfectly uniform-an individ-
ual who is a partner in name only can be an employee, but an individual
who is a partner in substance (or as a matter of economic reality) cannot.
The cases that commentators cite for the economic realities test side of
the putative split have merely sought to determine whether the individual
in question was really a partner, so as to decide whether the part-
ner-employee dichotomy should apply.98
To summarize, the pre-Clackamas cases reflect widespread confidence
within the federal judiciary that the partner-employee dichotomy is cor-
rect. At the same time, however, the cases fail to explain why such confi-
96. See Bannister, supra note 9, at 263-69; Creasy, supra note 9, at 1455-56; Ferguson,
supra note 9, at 710-22; Johnson, supra note 9, at 1072-73; Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 9,
at 679-89; Pokora, supra note 9, at 254-59; Prettyman, supra note 9, at 555-56; Sherman,
supra note 9, at 645-46; Stras, supra note 9, at 248-58.
97. See Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d at 705-06; Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987, 992
(1st Cir. 1997) (holding that employee status "cannot be decided solely on the basis that a
partnership calls-or declines to call-a person a partner" but concluding that the plaintiff
was undisputedly "a bona fide equity partner, and, as such, a person ineligible to claim the
protection which Title VII reserves for those who are employees"); Simpson v. Ernst &
Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "bona fide independent contrac-
tors and partners are employers, not employees" but that application of "the partner/em-
ployee dichotomy" must "focus not on any label, but on the actual role played by the
claimant in the operations of the involved entity" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
"[i]ndividuals acting like partners will not be classified as employees" and noting that "[a]n
employer may not avoid [the antidiscrimination laws] by affixing a label to a person that
does not capture the substance of the employment relationship"); Strother v. S. Cal.
Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that courts must engage
in "a factual inquiry which goes beyond merely ... the 'partner' label" in order "to deter-
mine if an individual should be treated as a partner or an employee for the purpose of
employment discrimination laws"); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-
01 (11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that, for determining the employee status of a professional
corporation's shareholder, the "federal case law [has] reduced the issue to the single ques-
tion 'partner or employee,"' though the inquiry still must "focus not on any label, but on
the actual role played by the claimant in the operations of the involved entity"); Wheeler v.
Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that "bona fide general part-
ners are not employees" under federal employment discrimination law but "'an employer
may not evade the strictures of [antidiscrimination law] simply by labeling its employees as
"partners""' (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 n.2 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring))); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986)
(noting that "true partners cannot be classified as employees" but that "'an employer may
not evade the strictures of [antidiscrimination law] simply by labeling its employees as
"partners""' (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 n.2)), abrogated by Clackamas Gastroen-
terology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 443 (2003); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867,
869 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[W]e do not see how partners can be regarded as employees rather
than as employers who own and manage the operation of the business."); see also
Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 520 ("The case law is consistent on at least one point. A
genuine partner, whatever that may be, cannot be an employee for federal employment
law purposes.").
98. See Serapion, 119 F.3d at 992; Simpson, 100 F.3d at 443-44; Devine, 100 F.3d at 81;
Strother, 79 F.3d at 867; Fountain, 925 F.2d at 1400; Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 277.
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dence might be justified.99 Part III.C argues that it is not.100
3. The Employer-Employee Dichotomy
Cases like Sidley Austin seem to reason, at least in part, that because
partners are employers they cannot be employees.10 1 In this way, the
principle that partners are not employees can be derived from a more
general dichotomy between employers and employees. Very few judicial
opinions state the employer-employee dichotomy explicitly, however,
and none presents any argument for it.
Only one published federal appellate case expressly endorses the em-
ployer-employee dichotomy. In Serapion v. Martinez, the First Circuit
stated that "a single individual in a single occupational setting cannot be
both an employer and an employee for purposes of Title VII." 1 0 2 Unfor-
tunately, the court did not explain why that might be. Rather, the court
cited three cases as authority for the dichotomy and left it at that.103
Of the three cases Serapion cites, only one actually states the dichot-
omy.104 In Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill, the district court ob-
served that "[u]nder Title VII, the terms 'employee' and 'employer' are
mutually exclusive."105 Like Serapion, the case states no basis for that
principle.106 Instead, the case merely cites, as its sole authority for the
alleged mutual exclusivity, the definitions section of Title VII.10 7 The
statutory definitions, however, provide no support for the dichotomy. On
the contrary, as was explained in Part I.A, they show, if anything, that
every employee is an employer because (1) under the common law of
master-servant relationships, every employee is an agent' 0 and (2)
under Title VII's definition of "employer," every agent of an employer is
99. See Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 493 (noting that the cases dealing with the em-
ployee status of partners are "confused" and "do not clearly explain why partners" cannot
be employees for purposes of federal employment law).
100. Of the circuits that have addressed the issue, the D.C. Circuit alone has expressed
some reluctance to accept the dichotomy. In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, the court
stated, "We note-without reaching the question ourselves-that some courts have held
that partners are not 'employees' under Title VII and that discrimination directed against
partners is therefore beyond the reach of the statute." 920 F.2d 967, 978 n.10 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
101. See supra, notes 90, 92; see also Simpson, 100 F.3d at 443 ("[B]ona fide indepen-
dent contractors and partners are employers, not employees . . . ."); Burke, 556 F.2d at 869
("[W]e do not see how partners can be regarded as employees rather than as employers
who own and manage the operation of the business."); Sherman, supra note 9, at 645 ("A
person must be either an employee or an employer; a person cannot be both."); Stras,
supra note 9, at 247 ("[Clourts have recognized that the terms employer and employee are
mutually exclusive under [federal employment discrimination statutes] ....
102. Serapion, 119 F.3d at 985.
103. Id. (citing Devine, 100 F.3d 78; EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th
Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill, 884 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.H. 1994)).
104. Johnson, 884 F. Supp. at 44.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a)-(k)).
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958); see also id. cmt. a ("A




The other two cases cited by Serapion as authority for the em-
ployer-employee dichotomy are Dowd & Dowd and Devine (the case in
which the Eighth Circuit sided with Dowd & Dowd in the split with Hy-
land).1"0 Neither case mentions the dichotomy, but Devine does rely on it
implicitly.",
In Devine, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that in order to decide whether
shareholders of a professional corporation "are employees or employ-
ers," the court must determine "the extent to which they manage and
own the business." 112 The court concluded, unsurprisingly, that the
shareholders do "manage and own" the business, so they are employers
and therefore not employees." 3 Like Serapion and Johnson, however,
the court gave no grounds for the principle that if the shareholders are
employers then they must not be employees (the employer-employee
dichotomy).
Finally, although Dowd & Dowd does expressly rely on the part-
ner-employee dichotomy, it does not rely even implicitly on the em-
ployer-employee dichotomy.114 The court's reasoning was straight-
forward: The shareholders in the professional corporation at issue were
not employees because (1) as a matter of "economic reality" they were
analogous to partners, and (2) partners are not employees.115
In sum, although the federal case law often relies implicitly on the em-
ployer-employee dichotomy, the cases contain few explicit statements of
the dichotomy and no explanations of its basis. Part III.B argues that at
one level the dichotomy is trivially true-one cannot be one's own em-
ployer or employee. But that proposition is irrelevant to the issue
presented in the cases that have relied on the dichotomy, which is the
following: If one is deemed an employer because one owns and manages
a business organization, can one nonetheless be an employee of that busi-
ness organization? For example, if the shareholders of a professional cor-
poration are deemed employers because they own and manage the
corporation, can they nonetheless be employees of the corporation? Part
109. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006). As was discussed in Part I.A, supra, the case law holds
that the statutory definitions do not mean that every employee is also an employer, be-
cause the relevant parts of the statutory definitions were meant only to make employers
liable in respondeat superior for discrimination by their employees. See supra notes 35-37
and accompanying text. The point here, however, is unaffected by those cases: Johnson's
reliance on the statutory definitions as support for the employer-employee dichotomy is
misplaced, because the definitions provide no support for the dichotomy and, if anything,
tend to undermine it.
110. Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Devine v. Stone,
Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78 (8th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736
F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984)).
111. Devine, 100 F.3d at 81.
112. Id. at 81-82.
113. Id.
114. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178.
115. Id.
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III.B argues that they can. Consequently, the employer-employee di-
chotomy, in the relevant sense, must be false.
II. CLACKAMAS'S SOLUTION: THE COMMON
LAW AND CONTROL
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
Viewed narrowly, the only issue before the Supreme Court in Clacka-
mas was the split between Dowd & Dowd, which the Eighth and Elev-
enth Circuits had followed, and Hyland, which the Ninth Circuit had
followed in the case under review.'16 That is, the issue was whether use
of the corporate form, including the form of a professional corporation,
"precludes any examination designed to determine whether the entity is
in fact a partnership."1 7
Viewed more broadly, however, the issue was how employee status
under federal employment discrimination statutes should be determined
in general. In previous cases involving the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Copyright Act of 1976, the Court
interpreted the statutory term "employee" on the basis of the common
law of master-servant relationships,"i8 but before Clackamas the Court
never had occasion to say what "employee" means for purposes of an-
tidiscrimination law. Thus, Clackamas gave the Court the opportunity to
decide once and for all whether the common law test, the economic reali-
ties test, the hybrid test, or some other test should govern determinations
of employee status for purposes of Title VII, the ADA, and the
ADEA.119
In Clackamas, the Court unequivocally resolved the narrow issue, re-
versing the Ninth Circuit and rejecting the Hyland rule, which the Ninth
Circuit had adopted.120 As for the broader issue, the Court followed the
same approach it had taken with ERISA and the Copyright Act, reason-
116. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442-44 (2003)
("We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Circuits, which extends beyond the
Seventh and the Second Circuits.").
117. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986),
abrogated by Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 443; see Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442-43.
118. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (interpreting
"employee" in the context of ERISA); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 739-40 (1989) (interpreting "employee" in the context of the Copyright Act).
119. See generally supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. Clackamas was an ADA
case, but the Court expressly recognized that the circuit split at issue involved Title VII and
the ADEA as well. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444 n.3 ("The disagreement in the Circuits is
not confined to the particulars of the ADA."). Thus, the Court apparently intended its
decision to apply to all three federal employment discrimination statutes.
120. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 446-47. Although the Court reversed, it did not determine
that shareholders in professional corporations are always employers rather than employ-
ees. Rather, it noted that in the case before it some factors tended to show that the share-
holders were employers, but other factors tended to show that they were employees. Id. at
451 & n.11. The Court therefore remanded the case to give the lower courts the opportu-
nity to make the employee status determination in the first instance under the proper test,
but the Court did not prejudge the outcome. Id. at 451.
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ing that the vacuous statutory definition of "employee" signaled Con-
gress's intent "'to describe the conventional master-servant relationship
as understood by common-law agency doctrine."1 21 The Court further
concluded that "the common-law element of control is the principal
guidepost that should be followed in this case." 122 Although the qualifi-
cation "in this case" creates some ambiguity about the intended scope of
the Court's holding, the case is most plausibly read as articulating a rule
of general application under the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA: For
purposes of the federal employment discrimination statutes, employee
status is to be determined by applying the common law of master-servant
relationships, with "the common-law element of control" serving as the
"principal guidepost." 123
Beyond the determination of those issues, the Court's discussion in
Clackamas also touches on several related subjects, including the part-
ner-employee and employer-employee dichotomies.124 Neither the
meaning nor the precedential value of the Court's statements on those
matters is entirely clear, however.
The Court obliquely addressed the partner-employee dichotomy in the
context of the defendant professional corporation's argument that the
status of a shareholder-director should be determined "by asking
whether the shareholder-director is, in reality, a 'partner,"' an argument
that presupposes the validity of the dichotomy.125 The Court rejected the
argument, saying that "[t]he question whether a shareholder-director is
an employee . . . cannot be answered by asking whether the share-
holder-director appears to be the functional equivalent of a partner."1 26
The Court reasoned that "[t]oday there are partnerships that include hun-
dreds of members, some of whom may well qualify as 'employees' be-
cause control is concentrated in a small number of managing partners."127
While the Court's rejection of the defendant's argument can be read as a
repudiation of the partner-employee dichotomy, it can also be read as
merely reiterating the familiar proposition that an individual who is a
partner in name only can still be an employee-only bona fide partners
are subject to the dichotomy.128 The latter interpretation is supported by
the Court's reliance on Justice Powell's often-quoted statement that "an
employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its
employees as 'partners. "1 2 9
121. Id. at 445 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23).
122. Id. at 448.
123. Id. at 445, 448; see also discussion supra note 119.
124. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445-46.
125. Id. at 445.
126. Id. at 446.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir.
1986), abrogated by Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 443.
129. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 n.2 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring);
see Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 446.
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The Court's position on the employer-employee dichotomy is no
clearer. Clackamas never addresses the dichotomy explicitly, but the
opinion does suggest that the Court took for granted that the dichotomy
is sound. In framing the issue presented, the Court said the question was
"whether a shareholder-director is an employee or, alternatively, the
kind of person that the common law would consider an employer."130
That statement appears to reflect agreement with the em-
ployer-employee dichotomy: The Court seems to have assumed that be-
ing an employer and being an employee are mutually exclusive
alternatives. The suggestion that the Court endorsed the dichotomy is
further strengthened by the opening quotation in Justice Ginsburg's dis-
sent: "'There is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence
of a proprietary and an employment relationship."'1 3 1 Although perhaps
inelegantly phrased, the quotation does appear to express rejection of the
employer-employee dichotomy; it seems to say that the roles of employer
(proprietor) and employee are not "inconsistent" and can "coexist." Jus-
tice Ginsburg's decision to begin her dissent with such a statement indi-
cates that, in her view, the majority opinion was based on the dichotomy.
Finally, two additional aspects of the Court's analysis should be noted.
First, in adopting the common law test for employee status, with a focus
on the element of control, the Court also endorsed certain guidelines
promulgated by the EEOC for use in determining whether "partners, of-
ficers, members of boards of directors, and major shareholders qualify as
employees." 132 The Court concluded that the following six factors listed
in the guidelines are relevant (though not exhaustive) for determining
employee status in this context: (1) "Whether the organization can hire or
fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual's
work"; (2) "Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises
the individual's work"; (3) "Whether the individual reports to someone
higher in the organization"; (4) "Whether and, if so, to what extent the
individual is able to influence the organization"; (5) "Whether the parties
intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written
agreements or contracts"; and (6) "Whether the individual shares in the
profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization."I3 3 As the discussion in
Part III of this Article will show, however, it is not clear that all of the
listed factors are relevant to employee status determinations under the
common law of master-servant relationships.
Second, and most importantly, the Court said that, "[a]s the EEOC's
standard reflects, an employer is the person, or group of persons, who
owns and manages the enterprise." 13 4 Part III of this Article argues that,
130. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445 n.5.
131. Id. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop.,
Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961)).
132. Id. at 448.
133. Id. at 449-50 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 EEOC, COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 605:0009 (2000)).
134. Id. at 450.
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like some of the factors listed in the EEOC guidelines, the proposition
articulated by the Court is fundamentally at odds with the common law of
master-servant relationships-at common law, the persons who own and
manage a business are frequently not the employers of the business's em-
ployees. That is, if an individual is an owner, a manager, or both, then as
a matter of the common law of master-servant relationships, it does not
follow that the individual is an employer. If that claim is sound, then
Clackamas is internally inconsistent and cannot be followed in its en-
tirety. The lower courts must choose between the Supreme Court's en-
dorsement of the common law of master-servant relationships, on the
one hand, and the Court's erroneous conflation of employers with owners
and managers, on the other.
B. THE POST-CLACKAMAS CASE LAW
In the six years since the Supreme Court decided Clackamas, a dozen
published opinions of the federal courts of appeals have cited it in con-
nection with determinations of employee status.135 For purposes of this
Article, a comprehensive survey of that case law is neither necessary nor
useful. Discussion of a few cases, however, will illustrate both how easy
and how problematic an uncritical application of Clackamas can be.
Solon v. Kaplanl36 is an easy case. In its application of Clackamas, it
presupposes either the employer-employee dichotomy, the part-
ner-employee dichotomy, the proposition that an owner-manager is an
employer, or some combination, and those presuppositions render the
analysis straightforward. The case involved a Title VII claim by a lawyer
against the law firm in which he had been one of four general partners.' 37
The district court determined on summary judgment that the plaintiff had
not been an employee of the firm, and the Seventh Circuit agreed.s38 The
court reasoned that because of the plaintiff's substantial management
rights and ownership interest in the firm, "he was an employer as a mat-
ter of law," and "no reasonable juror could find that [he] was an em-
ployee of the firm."1 3 9 It is not clear whether the court's reasoning was
based on the partner-employee dichotomy (and the assumption that the
plaintiff was a bona fide partner because he was an owner-manager) or
135. See Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008); De Jesus v. LTT
Card Servs., Inc., 474 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2007); Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124, 129-
30 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Clackamas in connection with an employee status determination
in an FLSA case); Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 460 F.3d 361, 371 (2d Cir. 2006);
Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 972, 976-78, 981, 983-84 (7th Cir. 2006);
Coleman v. New Orleans & Baton Rouge S.S. Pilots' Ass'n, 437 F.3d 471, 480-81 (5th Cir.
2006); Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2005); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 380
F.3d 219, 229-30 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of
Onondaga, 369 F.3d 113, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2004); EEOC v. Severn Trent Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d
438, 445 (7th Cir. 2004); Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004); EEOC
v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 351 F.3d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 2003).
136. 398 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2005).
137. Id. at 630, 634.
138. Id. at 631, 633.
139. Id. at 633-34.
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the employer-employee dichotomy (and the assumption that the plaintiff
was an employer because he was an owner-manager), but either would
lead to the same result: Because the plaintiff was one of four individuals
who owned and managed the firm, he could not be an employee.
Smith v. Castaways Family Dinerl40 is a problematic case. The plaintiff
was a waitress employed at a diner.141 The diner was a sole proprietor-
ship whose owner worked full time in the healthcare industry and dele-
gated management of the diner to her husband and her mother.142 The
husband and mother performed all management functions without having
to obtain the owner's prior approval, and they received regular
paychecks.143 The husband also "share[d] in the profits and losses of the
restaurant" in some unspecified manner, perhaps merely by being the
husband of the owner.144 When the waitress sued both the diner and its
owner for discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII, the
defendants argued that they had too few employees to be liable.' 45 The
district court agreed, concluding that under Clackamas the owner's hus-
band and mother were not employees.146 The Seventh Circuit
reversed.147
The court reasoned that there is an important distinction "between the
power that a supervisor or manager exercises as of right and the power
that he exercises by delegation."14 8 According to the court, only bona
fide "partners, corporate officers, members of boards of directors, and
major shareholders" have a "status" that gives them "a right to partici-
pate in the governance of the business .. . that is not wholly dependent on
the acquiescence of their superiors."1 49 The court concluded that the
point of the Clackamas test is to separate the bona fide owners, officers,
and directors from those "whose title or ownership in the business comes
without meaningful authority to run the business."o50 Thus, because the
husband and mother were neither owners nor officers,1st Clackamas was
"inapposite."1 5 2 And because Clackamas was the district court's sole ba-
140. 453 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2006).
141. Id. at 973.
142. Id. at 972.
143. Id. at 972-73.
144. Id. at 973, 985.
145. Id. at 973.
146. Id. at 974.
147. Id. at 972.
148. Id. at 980.
149. Id. at 980-81.
150. Id. at 978; see also id. at 980-82.
151. The court acknowledged that because the diner was a sole proprietorship, it had
no officers. Id. at 978 & n.3.
152. Id. at 981. Although Smith says that Clackamas does not apply to individuals
whose "status" gives them managerial authority by delegation rather than by right, see id.
at 980-81, the opinion also reasons that "even if [Clackamas] properly can be applied to an
individual who" lacks that status, such an application of the test must still "take into ac-
count" the distinction between authority by right and authority by delegation. Id. at 984.
Thus, under Smith, the distinction between authority by right and authority by delegation
might operate either as a precondition to application of the Clackamas test or as an ele-
ment of the test itself, but in either case, individuals who have managerial authority only by
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sis for concluding that the husband and mother were employers and not
employees, the judgment was reversed. 53
Smith represents a valiant attempt to get out of the following predica-
ment: On the one hand, the husband and mother obviously were not em-
ployers-the diner was a sole proprietorship, so the diner's owner was the
employer of the diner's employees. The husband and mother were
merely supervisory (or managerial) employees to whom broad discretion
had been delegated. On the other hand, under (a superficial reading of)
Clackamas, the husband and mother probably were employers because
they certainly "act[ed] independently and participate[ed] in managing the
organization."1 5 4 Indeed, the EEOC guidelines' six factors, which the Su-
preme Court endorsed, strongly suggest that the husband and mother
were employers, not employees. Their work was not supervised, they did
not report to anyone, they were able to influence the organization, and
one of them shared in the profits of the business.15 5 Thus, the problem
was to find a way to classify the husband and mother as employees even
though, under the test adopted by the Supreme Court, they apparently
were not employees.
The Smith court's solution was to dodge the test, finding it inapplicable
because the husband and mother held authority within the business only
by delegation, not by right.156 Unfortunately, that solution raises as many
questions as it answers.
The first problem is that, because the distinction between authority by
delegation and authority by right is not entirely clear, Smith might actu-
ally prohibit the application of Clackamas in a broad range of cases in
which one would have thought Clackamas should control. According to
Smith, managerial authority is held by delegation if it is "dependent on
the acquiescence of others." 57 But partnership is a matter of contract or
agreement, and general partners can expressly agree either that all of
them will hold managerial authority or that only some of them will.' 5 8
Because in either case every general partner's managerial authority is en-
delegation are not to be classified as employers under Clackamas. For the sake of simplic-
ity, the remainder of this Article's discussion of Smith will assume that the distinction oper-
ates as a precondition, not as an element, but nothing turns on this.
153. Id. at 974, 986-87.
154. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
155. See id. at 449-50. Of the remaining two factors, only one appears to weigh in favor
of a finding that the husband and mother were employees, because the diner presumably
"can hire or fire" them and can "set the rules and regulations" of their work. See id. at 449.
The last factor-whether the parties' written agreements expressed an intent that the hus-
band and mother be employees-appears to be neutral because there apparently were no
written agreements between the parties. See id. at 450. The Smith opinion mentions no
such agreements, and it does state categorically that the diner's owner "has never consid-
ered either [the husband or the mother] to be her employee." Smith, 453 F.3d at 973.
156. Id. at 978.
157. Id. at 985.
158. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPs & LLCs 116-17
(2004); 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 6, § 6.03(a)-(b); GREGORY, supra note 6,§ 187.
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tirely a matter of the voluntary agreement of all of the general partners, it
seems to be "dependent on the acquiescence of others" 159 and, hence, to
constitute authority by delegation. If that is correct, then Smith's holding
precludes application of the Clackamas test to general partners, even
though Smith correctly states that partners are precisely the sorts of indi-
viduals to whom the test is meant to be applied. 160
Putting aside that issue, the second problem is that Smith's holding ap-
pears to be either question-begging or anachronistic. According to Smith,
there are individuals whose "title" or "status" as partners, officers, direc-
tors, or major shareholders gives them managerial authority by right;
those are the individuals to whom Clackamas applies. 161 It is not, how-
ever, clear what all of that is supposed to mean.
On the one hand, it might mean that Clackamas applies only to people
who are bona fide owner-managers, people who have the required status
in substance, regardless of whether they possess formal titles like "part-
ner," "officer," or "director." If that is what Smith means, then it seems
question-begging because, as the Smith court itself acknowledged, the
point of Clackamas is to distinguish between people who are
owner-managers in substance and people who are not.162
On the other hand, the Smith rule might mean that Clackamas applies
only to people who have particular formal titles ("partner," "officer," "di-
rector"); the Clackamas test will then "serve to distinguish individuals
whose title or ownership in the business comes without meaningful au-
thority to run the business from those whose office or stake in the com-
pany is genuine." 163 But if that is what Smith means, then it resurrects
the very formalism that the Seventh Circuit repudiated in Dowd &
Dowd,164 a repudiation that the Supreme Court endorsed in Clacka-
mas.s65 On this reading of Smith, an individual can never be classified as
an employer under Clackamas unless the individual has a particular for-
mal title, so formal titles (or their absence) will often be dispositive.
For the foregoing reasons, no matter which way one interprets the
Smith rule-as focused on an individual's substantive status or formal ti-
tle-it is difficult to reconcile the rule with both Clackamas and prior
Seventh Circuit precedent. Thus, the Smith court's long and somewhat
opaque analysis fails to provide a convincing justification for what should
have been an obviously correct conclusion, namely, that two managerial
agents of a sole proprietorship are not employers of the proprietorship's
other workers.
159. Smith, 453 F.3d at 985.
160. Id. at 977.
161. Id. at 978, 980-81.
162. Id. at 978 (stating that the EEOC factors endorsed in Clackamas "serve to distin-
guish individuals whose title or ownership in the business comes without meaningful au-
thority to run the business from those whose office or stake in the company is genuine").
163. Id.
164. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984).
165. Clackamas, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003).
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The main moral of Smith, then, is that something appears to have gone
very wrong in the relevant body of legal doctrine. In Smith, straightfor-
ward application of the guidelines promulgated by the EEOC and en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court seems to lead to an obviously wrong
conclusion in what should have been an easy case. There must be a better
way.
III. REASSESSING THE DICHOTOMIES AND
RETHINKING CONTROL
A. AGENCY, EMPLOYMENT, CONTROL, AND OWNERSHIP
Given the pervasive doctrinal confusion of which Smith is merely a re-
cent and striking symptom, it seems wise to return to first principles. The
place to start should be the Restatement (Second) of Agency, both be-
cause it is the canonical synthesis of the common law of agency 66 and
because the Supreme Court relied on it as such in Clackamas,167
Darden,168 and Reid.169
According to the Restatement, "[a] master [or employer] is a species of
principal, and a servant [or employee] is a species of agent." 170 Principal
and agent are defined as follows: "Agency is the fiduciary relation which
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by
the other so to act." 171 "The one for whom action is to be taken is the
principal," and "[t]he one who is to act is the agent." 172 "To constitute
the relation, there must be an agreement, but not necessarily a contract,
between the parties." 173
What distinguishes the employer-employee relationship from other
principal-agent relationships is the type and extent of the principal's con-
trol over the agent's conduct. "A master is a principal who employs an
agent to perform service in his affairs and who controls or has the right to
control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the ser-
vice," and, correlatively, "[a] servant is an agent employed by a master to
perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance
166. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 158, at 19 ("In general, the single most influen-
tial source of legal rules in this area remains the American Law Institute's Restatement of
Agency."); cf. GREGORY, supra note 6, § 2.
167. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448.
168. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992).
169. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989). A few years
after the Supreme Court decided Clackamas, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
(2006) was published. This Article relies primarily on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY (1958) both because the Supreme Court's reliance on it has established its author-
itative status and because the Restatement (Third) of Agency contains no discussion of the
employee status of partners.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. a (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(2)-(3) (1958).
173. Id. § 1 cmt. b.
[Vol. 63164
Employee Status and the Concept of Control
of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the
master."1 74
Those uncontroversial provisions can be combined and summarized as
follows: Agency and employment result from an agreement that one
party (the agent) will act for or on behalf of the other party (the princi-
pal). If the relationship is such that the principal controls or has the right
to control the physical conduct of the agent, then the relationship is em-
ployment and not mere agency, the party "for whom action is to be
taken" 7 5 is an employer and not a mere principal, and the party "who is
to act" 176 is an employee and not a mere agent.177
Though all of those principles could scarcely be more banal, they yield
important insights into the defense arguments that have led the federal
courts so far astray. The defense arguments attempt to make use of the
familiar proposition that a certain type of control is the defining charac-
teristic of an employment relationship, and they thus conclude that if an
individual exercises (that type of) control, then the individual must be an
employer.
The problem, however, is that such reasoning invokes control at the
wrong point in the analysis. On a proper analysis, control tells you
whether an employment relationship exists (is this employment or mere
agency?), but it does not tell you which of the parties is the employer.
That determination is made antecedently, when you first determine
whether there is an agency relationship at all. If there is an agency rela-
tionship, then there is an agreement between two parties, one of whom is
to act for or on behalf of the other. The one on whose behalf action is to
be taken is the principal and hence may be an employer if the relationship
involves the requisite right to control. The one who is to act is the agent
174. Id. § 2(1)-(2); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(2) (1958).
176. Id. § 1(3).
177. In accord with the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Supreme Court in both
Reid and Darden endorsed a nonexhaustive list of factors that are "relevant" to determin-
ing "the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished." Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989). The
factors are:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location
of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether
the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 751-52 (citations omitted); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
323-24 (1992) (quoting Reid's list of factors); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07
cmt. f (2006) (providing a similar list of factors); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220 (1958) (same). Thus, as both the Court and the Restatements have made clear, the
factors are not elements of the definition of an employment relationship. Rather, they are
merely possible means of proving the element of control. Because only the element itself,
and not the potentially limitless ways of proving it, is relevant to the analysis presented in
this Article, the Reid/Darden factors will not be discussed further.
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and hence is ruled out as a potential employer, regardless of the results of
any subsequent inquiry into control. In short, once you figure out who is
the principal and who is the agent (by figuring out who is working on
behalf of whom), you already know who (if anyone) is going to be the
employer, before you ever get to the issue of control.178
Smith provides a useful illustration. The diner was a sole proprietor-
ship.179 The owner's husband and mother were agents of the diner (or of
its owner), because there was an agreement that they would act for or on
behalf of the diner. The diner and its owner were not, of course, agents
of the husband or mother, because there was no agreement that the diner
or its owner would act for or on behalf of the husband or mother. The
diner's other workers were likewise not agents of the husband and
mother, because there was no agreement that those workers would act
for or on behalf of the husband or mother. Rather, the diner's workers
acted for and on behalf of the diner, so they were agents of the diner, not
of the diner's managerial agents.180 It follows that the husband and
mother could not possibly have been employers, because they had no
agents and hence no employees. In this way, one can derive the intui-
tively correct conclusion that the husband and mother were not employ-
ers without ever considering the issue of control. The husband and mother
were parties to only one agency relationship (with the diner), and in that
relationship they were the agents, not the principals.
To be sure, it does not follow that the husband and mother were em-
ployees, as opposed to mere agents. To determine that, one would need
to know whether the diner (or its owner) had the requisite right to con-
trol their physical conduct. Nonetheless, the analysis in the previous par-
agraph shows that the issue that tied the Smith court in knots-namely,
178. The Clackamas opinion presents conflicting signals concerning the Court's grasp of
this point. On the one hand, after listing the Reid/Darden factors, the Court observed that
the factors were "not directly applicable" because they are used for "drawing a line be-
tween independent contractors and employees" rather than distinguishing employers from
employees. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 n.5
(2003). That reasoning is correct: The Reid/Darden factors are unnecessary for distinguish-
ing employers from employees because all you need to know is who is working for whom,
not the extent of the principal's control. On the other hand, in the remainder of the Clack-
amas opinion the Court focused on control as "the principal guidepost that should be fol-
lowed in this case," id. at 448, although control is the factor that the common law used to
distinguish between independent contractors and employees, which the Court previously
said was irrelevant, id. at 445 n.5.
179. Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 972 (7th Cir. 2006).
180. The lack of any agency relationship between the husband and the mother (as prin-
cipals) and the diner's other workers (as agents) is further borne out by other features of
the common law of agency. "An agent ... holds a power to alter the legal relations be-
tween the principal and third persons . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 12
(1958). That power consists in the agent's ability to bind the principal in dealings with
third persons or to subject the principal to tort liability. Id. § 12 cmt. a. The diner's wait-
ers, for example, must have had the power to bind the diner in dealings with customers, and
the diner must have been liable in respondeat superior for the waiters' negligent acts per-
formed in the course and scope of their employment. But there is no reason to believe that
the waiters had the power to bind the husband and mother personally in dealings with third
persons, or that the husband and mother could be held personally liable in respondeat
superior for the waiters' negligence.
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whether the husband and mother were employers-can and should be
straightforwardly resolved without any reliance on the concept of control.
All one needs to know is (1) who the parties to the agency relationship
are and (2) which of those parties is acting for or on behalf of the other.
Even if it is conceded, however, that the foregoing analysis is correct
and that the husband's and mother's status can thus be determined with-
out considering the issue of control, one might still wonder: What if one
does consider the issue of control? The husband and mother undisput-
edly exercised extensive control over the diner and its workers. 181 Does
that not show that the husband and mother were employers?
It does not. The key to understanding why is to keep a clear view of
the results of the previous analysis: The husband and mother were agents
of the diner, and the diner's other workers were not the husband's and
mother's agents. Thus, when the husband and mother exercised control
over the diner's other workers, they did so on behalf of their own princi-
pal, the diner. They were not exercising control over their own agents,
because the diner's other workers were not their agents. Rather, they
were exercising control over the diner's agents. They were therefore act-
ing as agents exercising control over the other agents of their own princi-
pal. Supervisory and managerial agents do that all the time. 182 Nothing
in the common law of agency implies that an agent who exercises such
control on behalf of a principal thereby becomes a principal too. The
control exercised by the husband and mother consequently has no ten-
dency to show that they were employers. They were merely agents who
were authorized to control their own principal's other workers.
It is possible that the Smith court was groping for that distinction-
between control exercised by a principal and control exercised by an
agent on behalf of a principal-with its talk of the difference between
authority by right and authority by delegation. 183 Not all of the Smith
court's statements on the subject are consistent with such a reading, of
course-the court said that corporate officers exercise authority "by
right,"184 but corporate officers are in fact agents exercising control on
behalf of their principal, the corporation. 85 In any event, it is certainly
true that a managerial agent who exercises control on behalf of a princi-
pal does so by delegation: The principal authorizes the agent to exercise
control and thereby delegates the principal's own right to control.
181. Smith, 453 F.3d at 972-73.
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 73(c) (1958) ("Unless otherwise
agreed, [an agent's] authority to manage a [principal's] business includes authority . . . to
employ, supervise, or discharge employees as the course of business may reasonably re-
quire . . . .").
183. See Smith, 453 F.3d at 980-81.
184. Id. It is also worth noting that the Smith court's claim that corporate officers exer-
cise authority by right rather than by delegation appears to be incorrect as a matter of the
law of corporations. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.




Despite that kernel of soundness, however, the Smith analysis suffers
from the doctrinal flaws that were discussed in Part II.B-either it deter-
mines employee status on the basis of formal titles (an approach that
Clackamas rejected) or it determines the applicability of Clackamas on
the basis of an independent resolution of an individual's substantive sta-
tus (although the individual's substantive status is precisely what Clacka-
mas is meant to resolve).186 The further point that now bears emphasis is
that, in addition to its unattractiveness as a purely doctrinal matter,
Smith's reasoning was a misguided and unnecessary response to Clacka-
mas as a practical matter. Recall that Smith held that Clackamas's stan-
dard for determining employee status applies only to individuals who
exercise control by right rather than by delegation.'87 Because the hus-
band and mother exercised control only by delegation, the Smith court
concluded that Clackamas was "inapposite."1 88 But had the court real-
ized that the common law of agency compels the conclusion that the hus-
band and mother could not be employers-because they were not
principals, because they had no agents-the court would have had no rea-
son to try to evade Clackamas. The central holding of Clackamas is that
employee status under federal employment discrimination law is gov-
erned by common law agency principles.189 Under those principles, the
husband and mother were not employers.
Smith's elaborate efforts to sidestep Clackamas were therefore unwar-
ranted. Clackamas and the common law standard it endorsed held the
key to a simple and intuitively satisfying resolution of the case all along.
The discussion up to this point might suggest that what was missing in
Smith was ownership-if the husband and mother had possessed not only
control rights but also ownership interests in the business, then they
would have been employers. And in Clackamas the Supreme Court ap-
parently endorsed such a view, stating that "an employer is the person, or
group of persons, who owns and manages the enterprise."1 90 That view
too is inconsistent with the common law of agency, however, as consider-
ation of a few examples will illustrate.
A corporation is owned by its shareholders, who possess certain man-
agement rights.191 But "[t]he contract of a corporation is the contract of
the legal entity and not of the shareholders individually."1 9 2 Conse-
quently, "[a] contract between a corporation and a third person is not
binding on its shareholders as individuals," even if "there is only one
shareholder."19 3 As noted above, however, agency and employment are
186. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
187. Smith, 453 F.3d at 980-81.
188. Id. at 981.
189. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003).
190. Id. at 450.
191. 12B FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 5717.
192. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 29, at 68 (rev. vol. 2006); see also id. § 25.
193. 12B FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 5710; see also 1 id. § 14 (rev. vol. 2006).
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a matter of contract or agreement.194 It follows that "[b]ecause a corpo-
ration enters into contracts in a capacity separate from its shareholders,
the corporation, not the shareholder, is the employing party in an em-
ployment relationship."19 5 Reformulated in terms of the common law of
agency, the point is that a corporation's employees act for or on behalf of
the corporation, not for the shareholders, and they do so pursuant to a
contract or agreement with the corporation, not with the shareholders. 1 9 6
The employees' principal and employer is thus the corporation, not the
shareholders. The shareholders are consequently not employers of the
corporation's employees, despite their ownership and (limited) control of
the corporation.
The same conclusions apply equally to corporate directors and officers:
Just as a corporation is distinct from its shareholders, "[a] corporation
and its directors and officers are similarly not the same personality." 1 9 7
In general, "[t]he individual liability of a corporate officer purporting to
act for a corporation is no different from that of any other agent." 98 At
common law, "[u]nless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting
to make a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does
not become a party to the contract."199 In this way, even an officer who,
on behalf of the corporation, signs a corporate employee's employment
contract is not a party to that contract.200 Consequently, a corporation's
officers and directors, like its shareholders, are not employers of the cor-
poration's employees.
The common law of agency provides still further support for those con-
clusions. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, "[a] master [or em-
ployer] is subject to liability for the torts of his servants [or employees]
committed while acting in the scope of their employment." 2 0 1 But "[a]t
common law, a corporate officer, shareholder, director, agent, or em-
ployee is not personally liable for the torts of a corporation or of any
other agent merely because of office or holdings; some additional connec-
tion with the tort is required." 202 In particular, "[t]he shareholders of a
corporation are not liable individually for torts committed by the corpo-
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b (1958).
195. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 29, at 75 (rev. vol. 2006).
196. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
197. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 25, at 47-50 (rev. vol. 2006).
198. Id.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006) ("When an agent acting with actual or apparent author-
ity makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal, (1) the principal and the third party
are parties to the contract; and (2) the agent is not a party to the contract unless the agent
and third party agree otherwise.").
200. Cf. 3A FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 1117, at 154-55 (rev. vol. 2002) ("[N]either the
officers nor the directors of a corporation are personally responsible for the debts of the
corporation merely because they are officers or directors of that corporation.").
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) ("An employer is subject to liability for torts committed
by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.").
202. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 33, at 86-87 (rev. vol. 2006).
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ration unless they personally participate in them." 203 Similarly, "[a]n of-
ficer or director of a corporation is not personally liable for torts of the
corporation or of its other officers and agents merely by virtue of holding
corporate office, but can only incur personal liability by participating in
the wrongful activity." 204 Again, it follows that under the common law of
agency a corporation's officers, directors, and shareholders are not em-
ployers of the corporation's employees: If they were, then they would be
subject to respondeat superior liability for corporate employees' torts,
but in fact they are not.
Again, all of those observations could scarcely be more banal, but to-
gether they conclusively establish that corporate shareholders, directors,
and officers are not employers of the corporation's workers. That conclu-
sion, in turn, establishes that the possession of control rights and owner-
ship interests in a business enterprise does not make one an employer
under common law agency doctrine. At common law, it simply is not true
that "an employer is the person, or group of persons, who owns and man-
ages the enterprise." 205
B. REASSESSING THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DICHOTOMY
Because agency and hence employment are relationships between two
parties, there is at least this much truth in the employer-employee dichot-
omy: One cannot be one's own employer or one's own employee, any
more than one can be one's own agent. 206 In that sense, an individual
cannot be both an employer and an employee-the same individual can-
not be both of the parties to an employment relationship.
But the defense arguments at issue in Clackamas and the related case
law depend upon a much more robust version of the dichotomy than that.
The defense arguments do not seek to establish that the individuals in
question are not employees of themselves. Rather, the arguments at-
tempt to show that the individuals are not employees of the alleged em-
ployer defendant.
For example, in Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, (one of the cases
involved in the circuit split that Clackamas resolved), the defense con-
tended that the attorney-shareholders of the defendant professional cor-
poration were not employees of that corporation. 207 The court adopted
the defense's contention on the basis of the following two-step argument:
First, because the physician-shareholders owned and controlled the busi-
203. Id. at 87.
204. 3A FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 1137 (rev. vol. 2002).
205. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003).
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. a (1958) ("The relation of
agency is created as the result of conduct by two parties manifesting that one of them is
willing for the other to act for him subject to his control, and that the other consents so to
act." (emphasis added)).
207. 100 F.3d 78, 80 (8th Cir. 1996).
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ness, they were employers. 208  Second, because the physi-
cian-shareholders were employers, they were not employees of the
defendant professional corporation. 209
The discussion in Part III.A shows that the first step fails. Ownership
and control do not make one an employer. But this Part argues that if
the first step in the argument were correct, the argument would still fail at
the second step. That is, if an individual who owns and manages a busi-
ness were eo ipso an employer, then an individual could be both an em-
ployer and an employee. The reasoning in cases like Devine therefore
cannot be correct, because at least one of its premises must be false.
It might, however, seem impossible for one individual to be both an
employer and an employee, not only because one cannot be one's own
employer but also because an owner-manager controls the business,
whereas an employee, by definition, is controlled by the business.210 So
how could the same individual both control and be controlled by the
same entity? The answer becomes clear once one recognizes that a single
individual can play multiple roles within a single business organization.211
Given that fact, there is no reason why the same individual cannot exer-
cise control in one role while being controlled in another.
That general phenomenon is extremely familiar and is not unique to
business organizations. Under any genuinely democratic form of govern-
ment, everyone who has voting rights has some measure of control over
the government. That control is unfettered-the government cannot tell
the voters how to vote. At the same time, however, all of those people
are subject to the government's control in all sorts of other ways. For
example, they must obey the criminal law or else suffer the consequences
of violating it. Thus in one role-as voters-they control the govern-
ment, but in another role-as citizens subject to the criminal law-the
government controls them.
As the discussion in Part III.A indicates, an individual can likewise play
multiple roles in an ordinary corporation. Consider, for example, an indi-
vidual hired by a corporation as an assembly-line worker. Assume that
the relationship between the individual and the corporation meets the
common law requirements for an employment relationship (that is, the
corporation has the right to control the individual's physical conduct on
208. Id. at 81 ("In deciding whether the shareholder-directors are employees or em-
ployers, we look to the extent to which they manage and own the business.").
209. Id. ("If the shareholder-directors manage and own [the corporation], they should
not be counted as employees.").
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1)-(2) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
211. One scholar has, to some extent, acknowledged this point in the context of deter-
minations of employee status for purposes of employment law. See Kleinberger, supra
note 9, at 493-94, 540, 558 (recognizing that the "mixed roles" of LLC members create
analytical difficulties, that "a shareholder/employee relates to a corporation in two capaci-




If the assembly-line worker buys some shares of the corporation's
stock, then the worker now has two roles within the corporation: em-
ployee and part-owner. 213 As a part-owner, the individual also has cer-
tain limited rights to participate in the management of the corporation.
For example, shareholders generally have the right to vote at sharehold-
ers' meetings, to elect directors, to reorganize the corporation, and to
consolidate or merge the corporation. 214 In that role, as a voting share-
holder, the individual thus exercises control over the corporation and is
free from the corporation's control-the corporation cannot tell the
shareholders how to vote. But in the role of assembly-line worker, the
individual continues to be subject to the corporation's control in all of the
same ways as before-the corporation still has all of the same rights to
control the individual's physical conduct on the assembly line. In this
way, the individual's stock ownership and the control rights that come
with it do not nullify the employment relationship that already existed.
The worker has not gone from being solely an employee to being solely
an owner. Rather, the worker is both an employee and an owner (with
some management rights). If ownership and control made one an em-
ployer, the worker would probably be both an employee and an
employer.215
If in addition to buying stock, the worker gets a seat on the corpora-
tion's board of directors, then the worker now has three roles within the
corporation: employee, part-owner, and director. As a director, the indi-
vidual has considerably more management rights than before, holding the
power to select corporate executives and generally to manage the corpo-
ration's affairs.216 In the role of director, the individual exercises control
over the corporation and is free from the corporation's control-the cor-
poration cannot tell the directors how to vote on board resolutions or
otherwise tell them how to run the corporation. But again, the individ-
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1)-(2) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).
213. See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 30, at 77-78 (rev. vol. 2006) ("A shareholder may
also be an employee of a corporation at the same time."); see also id. § 29, at 72-73 ("[A]
corporation has the same freedom of contracting with its shareholders that it has of con-
tracting with any other person, since a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity
from any or all of its shareholders. Conversely, a shareholder may deal or contract with his
or her corporation in the same manner as any other individual, and in so doing acquires the
same rights and incurs the same liabilities as would a stranger."); Note, Applicability of
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation, supra note 9, at 291-92 & n.60 ("[Olwnership alone
need not preclude the status of employee. .. . [A] stockholder of a large corporation can
also be an employee.").
214. See 12B FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 5717 (summarizing the powers and rights of
shareholders in general).
215. The Supreme Court recognized this point-that an employee can also be an owner
of the business-in the FLSA context in Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, 366
U.S. 28, 32 (1961), and Justice Ginsburg echoed it in her dissent in Clackamas. See Clacka-
mas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 451 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32).
216. See, e.g., 2 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 505 (rev. vol. 2006).
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ual's expanded control rights in the role of director do not nullify the
employment relationship that already existed. Again, the worker has not
gone from being solely an employee to being solely an owner-manager.
Rather, the worker is an employee and an owner and a manager. Thus, if
ownership and control made one an employer, then the worker would
certainly be both an employee and an employer.
The basic point here-that if an owner-manager were automatically an
employer, then an individual could be both an employer and an em-
ployee-is further illustrated by the multiple roles of corporate of-
ficers.2 17 A corporation's board of directors often delegates to an
executive officer, such as the president, extensive rights to manage and
control the corporation's affairs.2 1 8 If the president also owns stock in
the corporation (as is often the case), then the president is unquestiona-
bly an employer according to the first step of the defense argument. But
it is also a commonplace that corporate officers, even the highest-level
executive officers, can be employees of the very corporations they run.2 19
The Restatement (Third) of Agency illustrates the point as follows:
A, the CEO of P Corporation, exercises general managerial author-
ity over its operations. P Corporation's directors, concerned that A's
impaired vision makes it unsafe for A to drive, direct A to use a
driver and car to be furnished by P Corporation when A travels by
car on business. P Corporation's directors have the right so to direct
A. A is an employee of P Corporation for this purpose.2 2 0
What is particularly revealing about the illustration is that the chief exec-
utive officer "exercises general managerial authority over" the corpora-
tion, which, by the lights of the defense argument, would (probably)
mean that the officer is an employer. The Restatement (Third) nonethe-
less concludes that the corporation's right to control the officer's physical
217. See, e.g., Drescher v. Shatkin, 280 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2002). Drescher is perhaps
the most difficult of the pre-Clackamas cases to categorize. On the one hand, it anticipated
one aspect of the analysis presented in this Article by recognizing that even an individual
who is the president, sole director, and sole shareholder of a corporation "is its servant"
under the common law of agency. Id. On the other hand, the case concluded that such a
person is not an employee for purposes of antidiscrimination law, so it implicitly held,
contrary to Clackamas, that employee status determinations are not governed by the com-
mon law of agency. Id.
218. See, e.g., 2 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 495, at 558 (rev. vol. 2006) ("Thus, authority
to manage corporations with large and complicated business interests is usually delegated
by the directors to agents who are often, but not necessarily, officers of the corporation.");
2A id. §§ 553, 665, 667 (rev. vol. 2009) (describing the powers of corporate presidents, chief
executive officers, and general managers).
219. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. c (1958) (stating that "the
officers of a corporation . . . are servants [i.e., employees] equally with the janitor and
others performing manual labor"); cf. Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation, supra note 9, at 292 n.60 ("Supervisory and management personnel are 'em-
ployees' under Title VII,... and thus the existence of management responsibilities alone
should not preclude classifying a position as one of employment for purposes of Title
VII."); Doty, supra note 9, at 1686 n.53 ("Even the top management personnel, who some-
times own a large percentage of the corporation's stock, would be considered employees
under the ADEA.").
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f, illus. 15 (2006).
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conduct (by requiring that the officer be driven rather than drive) is dis-
positive of the officer's employee status.221 Thus, if the first step of the
defense argument were correct, then the second step (the em-
ployer-employee dichotomy) would have to be incorrect.
The illustration also shows that the EEOC guidelines on which the Su-
preme Court relied in Clackamas reflect considerable confusion on these
matters and that the guidelines are consequently at odds with the com-
mon law of agency, which the Clackamas opinion unequivocally en-
dorsed.222 In discussing the question of when "partners, officers,
members of boards of directors, and major shareholders qualify as em-
ployees," the EEOC guidelines frame the issue as "whether the individ-
ual acts independently and participates in managing the organization, or
whether the individual is subject to the organization's control." 223 The
problem with the guidelines' approach, however, is that those are not mu-
tually exclusive alternatives-a single individual can act independently
and participate in managing the organization and at the same time be sub-
ject to the organization's control. Consideration of the multiple roles that
a single individual can play within a single business organization makes
that clear; in one role (as shareholder and/or director) the individual can
act independently and participate in management, while in another role
(as assembly-line worker), the same individual is subject to the organiza-
tion's control. The Restatement (Third)'s illustration further confirms
the point-even a chief executive officer who exercises general manage-
rial authority over a corporation can at the same time be subject to the
corporation's control and thus be a corporate employee.224
In significant part, all of those conclusions flow from the basic common
law principles discussed in Part III.A. If being an employer automatically
followed from being an owner-manager, then not being an employee
could not possibly follow from being an employer. The reason is that
even if an individual is an owner-manager and hence an employer, the
questions still remain: Is there an agreement pursuant to which the indi-
vidual acts for or on behalf of a principal? And if so, does the principal
have the right to control the individual's physical conduct? 2 2 5 If the an-
swers to both questions are affirmative, then the individual is an em-
ployee under the common law definition regardless of any ownership
interest or control rights the individual might also possess.
Thus, even if the EEOC guidelines' framing of the issue were inter-
preted not as based on a strict dichotomy between those who control and
those who are controlled, but rather as aimed at determining the predom-
inant role that an individual plays-does the individual predominantly act
independently and participate in managing the organization, or is the in-
221. Id.
222. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003).
223. Id. at 448-49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f, illus. 15 (2006).
225. See supra Part III.A.
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dividual predominantly subject to the organization's control?-the
EEOC analysis would still be misbegotten. Is a citizen in a democracy
predominantly a voter or predominantly a subject of control by the crimi-
nal law? Is a shareholder/director/assembly-line worker predominantly a
controller or predominantly one of the controlled? Is the officer in the
Restatement (Third)'s illustration predominantly controlling or predomi-
nantly controlled?226 It is not clear that there are answers to any of those
questions, whatever they might mean. The reality is that those individu-
als do have multiple roles, and the only relevant question for determining
employee status is: In at least one of those roles, is the individual acting
for or on behalf of a principal and subject to the principal's right to con-
trol the individual's physical conduct? 2 2 7
In sum, although a weak version of the employer-employee dichotomy
is certainly true (because one individual cannot be both of the parties to
an employment relationship), the stronger version on which defendants
have relied (as stated in Serapion, "a single individual in a single occupa-
tional setting cannot be both an employer and an employee" 228) is cer-
tainly false, assuming that anyone with sufficient amounts of ownership
and control is an employer. There is consequently no way that defense
arguments of the kind adopted in Devine can be sound. Such cases apply
an incorrect standard to determine whether an individual is an employer,
as was explained in Part III.A. But if that standard were correct, an em-
ployer could also be an employee. 229
226. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f, illus.15 (2006).
227. Two of the factors in the EEOC guidelines, which the Supreme Court quoted with
approval, Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449-50, are problematic for similar reasons. According to
the EEOC guidelines, when determining whether an individual is an employee it is rele-
vant to consider "[w]hether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the
organization" and "[w]hether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of
the organization." Id. at 450. At common law, however, neither factor is relevant. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1)-(3) (1958). Neither factor has any tendency
to prove that an individual is or is not an agent whose physical conduct the organization
has a right to control. Both factors are consequently irrelevant to determinations of em-
ployee status under common law agency principles.
228. Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997).
229. Professor Ann C. McGinley is the only scholar who has previously noticed that the
defense arguments' reliance on the employer-employee dichotomy is problematic. See
McGinley, supra note 9, at 33-35. Professor McGinley argues that the dichotomy is false
purely as a matter of the statutory definitions of "employer," because all of the definitions
provide that "any agent of" an employer is also an employer. See id. Part L.A of this
Article pointed out, however, that Professor McGinley's claim appears to be incorrect,
because the federal appellate courts have, with good reason, interpreted the "any agent of'
an employer provisions as being merely a mechanism for holding employers vicariously
liable for unlawful discrimination by their agents. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying
text. The provisions thus do not mean that every agent is really an employer for purposes
of federal antidiscrimination law. See id.
The analysis presented in Parts III.A and B of this Article likewise systematically di-
verges from Professor McGinley's. First, whereas Professor McGinley attempts to refute
the employer-employee dichotomy on the basis of the statutory definitions alone, this Ar-
ticle evaluates the dichotomy in light of common law agency principles, which are control-
ling under Clackamas. Common law principles show that a weak version of the dichotomy
is true-one individual cannot be both of the parties to an employment relationship. See
supra note 206 and accompanying text. But the defense arguments rely on a more robust
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C. REASSESSING THE PARTNER-EMPLOYEE DICHOTOMY
One of the most remarkable aspects of the federal courts' assumption
that partners cannot be employees is that it directly contradicts the com-
mentary in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. According to the Re-
statement, if a partner "is in active management of the business or is
otherwise regularly employed in the business," then the partner "is a ser-
vant [or an employee] of the partnership." 2 3 0 The precise scope of that
proposition is not clear, because the commentary does not explain what is
meant by the phrases "active management of the business" and "other-
wise regularly employed in the business."23 The proposition does, how-
ever, unambiguously mean that partners can, at least in some
circumstances, be employees. Therefore, according to the leading author-
ity on the common law of agency, the partner-employee dichotomy must
be false.232
Given the Restatement's rejection of the dichotomy, why have so many
courts taken the dichotomy for granted? Although, as discussed in Part
I.B.2, the courts have not stated any intelligible basis for the dichotomy,
the reasons they have found it plausible presumably derive from the ways
in which partners are distinguishable from corporate owners and manag-
ers. First, partners do not merely share in the profits and losses of the
business in the way that corporate shareholders do. Rather, general part-
ners are exposed to unlimited personal liability for partnership debts. 2 3 3
Second, for various purposes the law follows the aggregate theory of part-
nerships, meaning it does not treat a partnership as an entity distinct from
version of the dichotomy than that, and common law principles show that the more robust
version would be false if it were true that having sufficient ownership interests and control
rights made an individual an employer. See supra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
Second, Professor McGinley appears to believe that a sufficient amount of ownership and
control does make one an employer, or at least prohibits one from being an employee for
purposes of federal antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 9, at 37, 55.
Parts III.A and B of this Article argue to the contrary that an individual can be an owner
and a manager, even a dominant one, while still being an employee. Even if the same
individual is a corporation's majority shareholder, chief executive officer, and chairman of
the board of directors, the individual can still be an employee of the corporation. See supra
Parts III.A-B.
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958). The Restatement
(Third) of Agency contains no discussion of the employee status of partners.
231. Id.
232. See also Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation, supra note 9,
at 292 n.60 ("The characteristics of joint liability, mutual obligation, and the participation
of each partner in controlling the activities and direction of the partnership do not establish
the absence of an employment relationship . . . ."). It should also be noted that some state
worker's compensation statutes and cases recognize to some extent that partners can be
employees of their own partnership. See, e.g., Hargiss v. Royal Air Props., 23 Cal. Rptr.
683, 685 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Mary Len Mine v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 148 P.2d 106,
108 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Johnson v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 244 P. 321, 322 (Cal.
1926); 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 6, § 1.03(c)(7); GREGORY, supra note 6, § 193;
Doty, supra note 9, at 1687 & n.62.
233. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P'smep Acr § 306 (amended 1997), 6(I) U.L.A. 117
(2001); UNw'. P'sHiP Act § 15 (1914), 6(I) U.L.A. 613 (2001); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 158,
at 132; 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 6, § 5.08(a); GREGORY, supra note 6, § 206.
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its general partners. 234 Consequently, conclusions concerning employee
status that depend upon the separate personality of corporations235 might
not hold true in the partnership context. More precisely, if a partnership
is nothing but the aggregate of its general partners, then it is hard to see
how a partnership could employ its partners or in any way control them.
Numerous commentators have made various forms of that reasoning ex-
plicit. For example, one has argued, "Because a partnership is the part-
ners, it cannot also employ the partners. Stated from another angle, a
partnership simply cannot employ itself."2 3 6 And by similar reasoning, if
a partnership is the partners, it cannot control the partners-a partner-
ship cannot control itself.
Despite the surface appeal of those arguments, careful examination
reveals that each of them is mistaken. It is certainly true that a partner-
ship cannot employ itself, because a single entity cannot be both of the
parties to an agency relationship.237 But it does not follow that a partner-
ship cannot employ an individual partner, because a partnership is not
identical, on either the entity theory or the aggregate theory, to an indi-
vidual partner. That is, on either theory an individual partner is distinct
from the partnership as a whole and hence can be an employee of the
partnership.
Those reflections are borne out by the following fundamental and uni-
versally accepted feature of partnership law, as reflected in both the Uni-
form Partnership Act (UPA) and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA): General partners are agents of their partnership.238 It follows
that the concerns based on the proposition that "a partnership simply
cannot employ itself" 239 must be unsound, because precisely the same
reasoning ("a partnership simply cannot be an agent of itself") would
show that partners cannot be agents of their own partnership. Moreover,
under the common law definition, an agent is one who acts for or on
behalf of a principal "and subject to [the principal's] control."2 4 0 Thus,
234. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHip Acr § 29 (1914), 6(11) U.L.A. 349 (2001) (providing that a
partnership dissolves if any partner leaves); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 158, at 115-16; 1
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 6, § 1.03(a)-(b); GREGORY, supra note 6, § 182.
235. See supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
236. Creasy, supra note 9, at 1454; see also Note, Applicability of Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation, supra note 9, at 286-90; Note, Tenure and Partnership, supra note 9,
at 462; Raker, supra note 9, at 982-89; Bannister, supra note 9, at 263; Doty, supra note 9,
at 1684-88; Horst, supra note 9, at 854-55; McGinley, supra note 9, at 47-48; Winters, supra
note 9, at 421, 447-48; cf. GREGORY, supra note 6, § 193 (concluding that such problems
"disappear under an entity theory").
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. a (1958) ("The relation of
agency is created as the result of conduct by two parties manifesting that one of them is
willing for the other to act for him subject to his control, and that the other consents so to
act.") (emphasis added).
238. See REVISED UNIF. P'sHip Acr § 301(1) (amended 1997), 6(I) U.L.A. 101 (2001);
UNIF. P'SHIP AcT § 9(1) (1914), 6(I) U.L.A. 553 (2001); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra
note 6, § 4.01(b); GREGORY, supra note 6, §§ 184, 194.
239. Creasy, supra note 9, at 1454.
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) (emphasis added); see also RE-
STATEMENT (TmRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 & cmt. c (2006) ("A relationship is not one of
agency within the common-law definition unless ... the principal has the right throughout
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because it is well established that partners are agents of their own part-
nership, it follows that it is similarly well established that partners are
subject to their own partnership's control. The concerns based on the pro-
position that "a partnership cannot control itself" therefore must be un-
sound as well, because they too would show that partners cannot be
agents of their partnership.
It might be tempting to infer from the foregoing considerations that
partners' status as agents of the partnership shows that, for purposes of
agency relationships, partnership law reflects the entity theory-partners
are agents of their partnerships, so the partnerships must be distinct enti-
ties. 2 41 The better conclusion to draw, however, is that the distinction
between the entity theory and the aggregate theory is actually irrelevant
to this entire discussion. Even if a partnership is nothing over and above
the aggregate of its partners, the aggregate as a whole is still distinct from
any individual member of the aggregate. For an individual partner to be
an agent of the partnership, the partnership need not be an entity that is
distinct from all of its partners taken together. Rather, it must be an en-
tity distinct from the individual partner, because the individual partner
cannot be both of the parties to an agency relationship. 242 On either the
entity theory or the aggregate theory, the partnership is not identical to an
individual partner, so neither theory presents any obstacle to classifying
an individual partner as an agent or employee of the partnership. Similar
reasoning applies to the concerns about the issue of control under the
aggregate theory. Because an aggregate of multiple partners is not iden-
tical to an individual partner, there is no conceptual problem with an indi-
vidual partner's being controlled by an aggregate of which the partner is a
member. Once again, the distinction between the aggregate theory and
the entity theory appears to be irrelevant-a partner can be an agent or
employee of the partnership on either theory. 243
the duration of the relationship to control the agent's acts.... A principal's right to control
the agent is a constant across relationships of agency . . . .").
241. See Robert W. Hillman, Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look at Participatory
Rights in the Management of General Partnerships, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 865, 880 (noting
that the UPA's main "provision concerning partners as agents reflects the entity view of
the partnership").
242. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
243. That analysis also shows why both corporations and partnerships are relevantly
different from sole proprietorships. A corporation is an entity distinct from any individual
shareholder, even if there is only one shareholder, as long as the doctrines of "alter ego" or
"piercing the corporate veil" do not apply. See supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text;
see also 1 FLETCHER, supra note 72, §§ 41, 41.10 (rev. vol. 2006) (describing the doctrines
of piercing the corporate veil and alter ego). Similarly, a partnership is an entity distinct
from any individual partner, on either the entity theory or the aggregate theory. But in the
case of a sole proprietorship, there is no separate entity that owns the business. Thus,
although a sole proprietor cannot be an employee of the sole proprietorship because there
must be two parties to an agency relationship, there is no parallel obstacle to classifying a
partner or even a corporation's sole shareholder as an employee (again assuming that
there is no basis for alter ego liability). See also infra note 270.
It must be emphasized that there is nothing distastefully formalistic about this reasoning.
The separate personality of corporations (in the absence of alter ego liability) is not a piece
of mere formalism that can be casually discarded but rather is a bedrock principle of cor-
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Because (1) every partner is an agent of the partnership, (2) every
agent is subject to control by the principal, and (3) an employee is just an
agent whose principal has the right to control the agent's physical con-
duct, all that is needed to make a partner an employee of the partnership
is for the partnership to have that additional type of control. There is no
reason why a partnership agreement could not expressly or implicitly
grant the partnership such a right, or why such a right could not be
granted by a separate (express or implied) agreement between the part-
nership and a particular partner.2 44
Many partnerships presumably do have such rights. A law partnership
or a medical practice organized as a partnership might, for example, im-
pose a dress code on its working partners, but it could not do so if it had
no right to control their physical conduct. Similarly, such professional
partnerships might also have sexual harassment policies that forbid cer-
tain kinds of physical contact between partners and partnership staff
members in the workplace. Professional partnerships also presumably
have the right to forbid partners from inappropriate physical contact with
customers-it is hard to believe that many law or medical partnerships
lack the right, either express or implied, to prohibit their partners from
physically assaulting the firm's clients.245
The only obvious objection to that line of reasoning (putting aside the
concerns generated by the aggregate theory) is that a partnership cannot
have the right to control its general partners because, on the contrary, the
general partners control the partnership. 246 As Part III.B explained,
however, an individual can play multiple roles in a business organization,
so there is no reason why an individual cannot control the organization in
poration law that applies even when there is only one shareholder. See 1 FLETCHER, supra
note 72, § 25.10 (rev. vol. 2006) ("A sole shareholder and the corporation are not one and
the same, but are distinct and separate legal entities and must be so treated."); see also id.
§§ 25-49. That a partnership (even on the aggregate theory) has a separate existence from
an individual partner is likewise not some debatable formalistic point, but rather is an
obvious substantive fact-two (or more) people are not and cannot be identical to one.
244. In general, partners are free to transact business with, and hence enter into con-
tracts with, the partnership in the same manner as a third party. See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP
Acr § 404(f) (amended 1997), 6(I) U.L.A. 143 (2001).
245. It should be acknowledged that this analysis, like the Restatement (Third) of
Agency's hypothetical discussed supra note 220 and accompanying text, is in various ways
oversimplified. The case law and literature on the distinction between employees and in-
dependent contractors, and on the element of physical control that forms the basis for that
distinction, is vast and complex, and it is by no means clear that a single, trivial right of
physical control is, in isolation, always sufficient to establish an employment relationship.
See, e.g., 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 26.11 (3d
ed. 2008). For purposes of this Article, however, that additional complexity is inconse-
quential. The point is that the employer-employee dichotomy, the partner-employee di-
chotomy, and the related misuses of the concept of control have, in the employment
discrimination context, distorted the test for employee status beyond recognition. Only
after those errors are acknowledged and corrected can the traditional distinction between
employees and independent contractors-in all its complexity and vagueness-be properly
applied.
246. Cf. Creasy, supra note 9, at 1454 ("Traditionally, a partner could not stand in an
employment relationship with his or her partnership because partners personally control
the ownership interests, making them employers rather than employees.").
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certain respects while being controlled by it in others. Just as legislators
can vote as they choose on pieces of proposed legislation but are bound
by the terms of any legislation that is ultimately enacted, each partner is
free to vote for or against the partnership's adoption of any particular
policies but must abide by the policies that the partnership actually
adopts.
Indeed, the previous analysis shows that under common law agency
doctrine and well-established partnership law, partners must play such
dual roles because, again, partners have the right to manage and control
the partnership business,2 4 7 partners are agents of the partnership, 248 and,
by definition, an agent acts for or on behalf of a principal "and subject to
[the principal's] control."2 4 9 It is therefore undeniable that partners both
have the right to control their partnership (in their role as the partner-
ship's managers) and are subject to the partnership's right to control
them (in their role as the partnership's agents). Again, as long as it is
possible for the partnership to have the additional type or amount of con-
trol that creates an employment relationship-and there is no reason why
the partnership could not-the partner-employee dichotomy must be
false.
Partners' unlimited personal liability for partnership debts likewise
does not show that partners cannot be employees. Again, the only rele-
vant questions are: Are partners agents of the partnership? If so, does
the partnership have the right to control their physical conduct in the
performance of their work for the partnership? Longstanding partner-
ship law dictates an affirmative answer to the first question, and nothing
in partnership or agency law requires a negative answer to the second,
notwithstanding partners' unlimited personal liability.
One final consideration that might seem to weigh in favor of the part-
ner-employee dichotomy is the issue of limits. For example, the court in
Wheeler v. Main Hurdman was troubled by the prospect that a rule al-
lowing some partners to be classified as employees might not "encompass
reasonable limits" and, on the contrary, might "result in every partner"
turning out to be an employee for purposes of employment discrimina-
tion law.2 5 0 The discussion above concerning professional partnerships'
rights to control their partners' physical conduct seems to validate that
247. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 401(f) (amended 1997), 6(I) U.L.A. 133 (2001); UNIF.
P'SHIP Acr § 18(e) (1914), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (2001); 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note
6, § 6.03(a)-(b); GREGORY, supra note 6, § 187.
248. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 301(1) (amended 1997), 6(1) U.L.A. 101 (2001);
UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 9(1) (1914), 6(I) U.L.A. 553 (2001); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra
note 6, § 4.01(b); GREGORY, supra note 6, §§ 184, 194.
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) (emphasis added); accord RE.
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 & cmt. c (2006) ("A relationship is not one of
agency within the common-law definition unless .. . the principal has the right throughout
the duration of the relationship to control the agent's act.. . . A principal's right to control
the agent is a constant across relationships of agency . . . .").
250. Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 272 (10th Cir. 1987).
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concern, because it suggests that all or most partners in law or medical
partnerships are employees of their partnerships.
Upon careful examination, however, the issue of limits becomes much
less problematic than it might initially appear to be. The key is to concep-
tualize the multiple roles that an individual can play in a partnership on
the model of the multiple roles that an individual can play in a corpora-
tion: shareholder, director, officer, and production worker. What makes
the status of partners seem confusing is that they often fuse those roles
under one title, "partner." But that multiplicity of roles does not change
the fact that law partners are, in effect, the assembly-line workers of the
partnership-they are the direct producers of the products that the firm
sells, namely, legal advice and representation. Hence, regardless of what
other roles they play as owners and managers, they are employees of the
partnership, assuming that the partnership has the right to control their
physical conduct on the job.
The soundness of analyzing the employee status of partners in this way
becomes still clearer when one puts aside professional partnerships and
considers partnerships that operate other kinds of businesses. Suppose,
for example, that the diner in Smith was not a sole proprietorship in
which the owner's husband worked as a manager,251 but rather was a
general partnership in which the wife and husband were equal partners.
Suppose further that the wife and husband did not work at the diner at all
but exercised their power, as partners, to delegate general managerial au-
thority over the diner to the wife's mother, who both worked as the
diner's hostess (that is, she greeted and seated customers) and was re-
sponsible for the day-to-day management of the diner's affairs. In that
case, the wife and husband would not be employees. They would occupy
roles analogous to shareholders and perhaps very hands-off directors of a
corporation. The mother, however, would be like both a production
worker and a chief executive officer to whom broad managerial authority
had been delegated. As long as the partnership retained the right to con-
trol her physical conduct-as in the Restatement (Third) of Agency's il-
lustration 252-she would be an employee.
Now suppose both that the wife and husband admit the mother to the
partnership, making her the third general partner, and that they all con-
tinue to work in the same capacities as before; the wife and husband do
virtually nothing, and the mother continues to hostess and manage the
diner's day-to-day affairs. In that case, it would seem that no one's em-
ployee status would have changed. The husband and mother would still
occupy roles similar to shareholders and directors, and, although the
mother would have also acquired those roles, she would not have lost her
roles as a production worker and a chief executive officer. She would still
be the one in the diner every day, working for the partnership. If the
251. Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 972 (7th Cir. 2006).
252. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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partnership still had the right to control her physical conduct on the job,
she would still be an employee.
That analysis of the hypothetical yields a plausible interpretation of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency's description of the conditions under
which a partner is an employee of the partnership. According to the Re-
statement, a partner who is either "in active management of the business"
or "otherwise regularly employed in the business" is an employee.253
Partners who are mere owners and "passive" managers, like corporate
directors or the wife and husband in the hypothetical, are not employees.
But partners who are "active" managers, like corporate executive officers
or the mother in the hypothetical, are employees. And partners who do
nonmanagerial work for the business, like a corporate factory worker or,
again, the mother in the hypothetical (who worked as a hostess in the
diner), are employees as well.
To be sure, that approach to determining partners' employee status
does not provide bright-line rules that will be easy to apply in every case.
Although the proper analysis of the hypothetical is reasonably clear,
there will inevitably be cases involving partners who do not fall so clearly
on one side of the line or the other.
But the failure of the analysis to provide an easy answer in every case is
not, of course, a flaw. Under any reasonable standard, there will always
be both easy and hard cases. The approach proposed here gives a coher-
ent way of conceptualizing the matter, conforms to the common law of
agency, and respects the Restatement (Second) of Agency's explicit state-
ments on the specific issue of whether partners can be employees. The
federal courts' unthinking reliance on the partner-employee dichotomy
lacks those virtues.
D. RETHINKING CLACKAMAS
In Clackamas, the Supreme Court noted that professional corporations
are "a new type of business entity that has no exact precedent in the
common law." 254 The unusual features of professional corporations,
however, present no obstacle to applying the common law analysis devel-
oped above.
Professional corporations have "been described as simply another type
of business corporation." 2 5 5 "In general, the shareholders of professional
service corporations are accorded the limited liability of shareholders in
traditional corporations." 2 5 6 Shareholders of professional corporations
are generally liable for their own misconduct and for the misconduct of
other shareholders working under their direct supervision or control. 257
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958).
254. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003).
255. 1A FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 70.10, at 12 (rev. vol. 2002).
256. 13 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 6245.50, at 484 (rev. vol. 2004); see also 1A
FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 70.10, at 12 (rev. vol. 2002) (quoting 18 AM. JUR. 2d Corpora-
tions § 37 (1985)).
257. See 13 FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 6245.50, at 484-85 (rev. vol. 2004).
182 [Vol. 63
Employee Status and the Concept of Control
But that is not an exception to the general rule of corporate limited liabil-
ity, because if an officer of an ordinary corporation "participates in ...
wrongful conduct, or knowingly approves the conduct, the officer, as well
as the corporation, is liable for the penalties. The person injured may
hold either liable, and generally the injured person may hold both as joint
tort-feasors." 258
Rather, the only exception to the general rule of corporate limited lia-
bility is that some states subject a professional corporation's shareholders
to unlimited tort liability for other shareholders' misconduct that is "asso-
ciated with the delivery of professional services." 259 In other words, in
some states each shareholder is liable for any professional malpractice
committed by the firm, regardless of whether the shareholder was directly
involved. But even in states following that rule, "the traditional concept
of limited liability applies" to any "corporate liability not directly related
to the delivery of professional services." 260 It follows that a professional
corporation's shareholders, just like the shareholders of an ordinary cor-
poration, are not personally liable on the employment contracts of the
professional corporation's workers.
The laws governing Oregon professional corporations, which were at
issue in Clackamas,261 illustrate the point. Under Oregon law, a share-
holder of a professional corporation is "jointly and severally liable" with
the other shareholders "only for the negligent or wrongful acts or omis-
sions or misconduct committed in the rendering of specified professional
services on behalf of the corporation to persons who were intended to
benefit from the service or services." 262 Apart from that limited excep-
tion for the rendering of professional services, however, the liability of
Oregon professional corporations' shareholders is the same as for other
corporations' shareholders: An Oregon professional corporation is "lia-
ble for its acts in the same manner and to the same extent as any" ordi-
nary Oregon business corporation, and "the shareholders, directors,
officers, employees and agents of the corporation are not personally lia-
258. 3A FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 1135, at 202-03 (rev. vol. 2002); see also id. at 200-
01 ("An individual is personally liable for all torts which that individual committed, not-
withstanding the person may have acted as an agent or under directions of another. This
rule applies to torts committed by those acting in their official capacities as officers or
agents of a corporation."); Kleinberger, supra note 9, at 541 (recognizing that the "per-
sonal liability" of a professional corporation shareholder "for his or her own malpractice"
is "not distinctive," because "[n]othing in the law of agency or ordinary corporations
shields [a] shareholder/employee from liability for his or her own negligence"). Both the
Supreme Court and the dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit case that was reversed in
Clackamas seem to have been confused on this point, because both referred to professional
corporations' shareholders' personal liability for their own negligence (and the negligence
of those under their direct supervision and control) as one of "the differences between an
Oregon physicians' professional corporation and an ordinary business corporation."
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 443 & n.2.
259. 12B FLETCHER, supra note 72, § 5714.50, at 18.
260. Id.
261. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442-43 & n.2.
262. OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185(4) (2008); see also id. § 58.185(7).
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ble for the debts or other contractual obligations of the corporation." 2 6 3
Against that background, the analysis developed in Parts III.A, B, and
C can be applied with little difficulty to professional corporations in gen-
eral and to Oregon professional corporations in particular. First, al-
though the shareholders of a professional corporation own and control
the corporation, that does not make them employers of anyone. The em-
ployer of the professional corporation's workers is the corporation, not its
shareholders-the workers act for or on behalf of the corporation, not its
individual owners. There are two grounds for that conclusion, each of
which is independently dispositive: (1) The shareholders are not person-
ally liable on the employment contracts of the corporation's workers, and
(2) the shareholders are not personally liable in respondeat superior for
the workers' torts that are not committed in rendering professional ser-
vices.264 Thus, for example, if a receptionist at the professional corpora-
tion's place of business negligently spilled coffee on the floor of the
waiting room, causing a delivery person to slip, fall, and sustain injury,
the professional corporation would be liable in respondeat superior, but
the individual shareholders would incur no personal liability at all. They
are not the receptionist's employer.
Second, just as a professional corporation's shareholders' ownership
and control does not show that they are employers, it also does not show
that they are not employees. Each of the four physician-shareholders in
Clackamas played multiple roles in the professional corporation. Each of
them was a shareholder, a director, and a physician "actively engaged in
medical practice" in the corporation's business.265 In their roles as share-
holders and directors, they controlled the corporation. But in their roles
as doctors treating patients in the professional corporation's medical
practice, they acted for and on behalf of the professional corporation and
were subject to the professional corporation's right to control their physi-
cal conduct (for example, the professional corporation could presumably
dictate rules about the wearing of gloves for various procedures). 266
Under the common law of agency, they were therefore employees-they
were, in effect, the professional corporation's assembly-line workers.
And also as a matter of the common law of agency, their other roles as
owners and managers are irrelevant to that determination. Under com-
mon law principles, they were owners and managers and employees.
Moreover, although under Oregon law the shareholders were jointly and
severally liable for each other's professional negligence, the professional
corporation itself was also liable for such negligence as well as for any
263. Id. § 58.185(10); see id. § 60.151.
264. See supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
265. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442.
266. Id. at 451 n.11 (noting that the physician-shareholders "must comply with the stan-
dards established by the clinic"); see also id. at 452-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("When
acting as clinic doctors, the physician-shareholders appear to fit the Restatement defini-
tion. The doctors provide services on behalf of the corporation, in whose name the prac-
tice is conducted. . . . In performing their duties, the doctors must 'comply with . . .
standards [the organization has] established."').
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other torts committed by the shareholders in the course and scope of their
employment. 267 If a shareholder rather than a receptionist negligently
spilled coffee on the waiting room floor and thereby caused a delivery
person's injury, then the professional corporation would be liable but the
other shareholders would not. This too shows that the shareholders must
be employees of the corporation-if they were not, then the corporation
would not be liable in respondeat superior for their torts.
Third, even if, because of their joint and several liability for each
other's professional negligence (or for some other reason), a professional
corporation's shareholders were thought to be "really" or "in substance"
partners, it still would not follow that they were not employees, because
partners can be employees. As always, the only issues are: Are they
agents of the corporation, and, if so, does the corporation have the right
to control their physical conduct on the job? If one of the professional
corporation's shareholders is merely an owner and a passive manager,
like a shareholder and director of an ordinary corporation, then that
shareholder is not an employee. But any shareholder who is "in active
management of the business" or "otherwise regularly employed in the
business" 268 (such as by directly providing professional services to the
corporation's clients) and whose physical conduct on the job is subject to
the corporation's right to control is an employee. All four of the share-
holders in Clackamas were "actively engaged in medical practice" on be-
half of the corporation and were required to comply with the
corporation's standards. 269 Under the common law of agency, all of them
were employees of the corporation. 270
267. See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185(3), (10) (2008).
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958).
269. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442, 451 n.11.
270. As noted earlier, one pre-Clackamas case concluded that even though an individ-
ual who was the president, sole director, and sole shareholder of a professional corporation
was an employee of the corporation under the common law of agency, the individual still
was not an employee for purposes of antidiscrimination law because he "so dominate[d]
the affairs of the [corporation] that [he] must be seen as in control of the very policies and
actions of which [an employment discrimination plaintiff] would be complaining."
Drescher v. Shatkin, 280 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2002); see also supra note 217. The court in
that case also rejected the contention of the plaintiff-who was not the president-that
although the president should not be considered an employee for purposes of determining
whether the president himself had the right to sue the corporation for employment dis-
crimination, he should be considered an employee for purposes of determining whether
the corporation had enough employees to be subject to employment discrimination law at
all. See Drescher, 280 F.3d at 204-06. See generally supra notes 32-33 and accompanying
text. The court ultimately concluded that because the president was not an employee, the
corporation had too few employees to be subject to Title VII liability, so the court affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. Drescher, 280 F.3d at 206.
The analysis presented in this Article bears out Drescher's conclusion that the president
was an employee under common law agency principles, see supra notes 217-20, 243 and
accompanying text, and Clackamas confirms that there is only one test for determining
employee status, see supra note 33. The aspect of Clackamas that Drescher failed to antici-
pate, however, is that the one test for employee status is the common law.
It should be noted that Drescher's analysis appears misguided in other important re-
spects. The court reasoned that if an individual so dominates the defendant entity's affairs




Clackamas can be viewed as the culmination of decades of missteps by
the federal judiciary to the severe detriment of employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs. The doctrinal foundation of the defense position-that an
individual who owns and controls a business is therefore an employer-
does not withstand even minimal scrutiny, as the defense bar would be
the first to point out in a respondeat superior case. The other doctrinal
underpinnings of the defense arguments-that employers cannot be em-
ployees and that partners cannot be employees-fare no better. But the
Supreme Court in Clackamas, like the lower courts in previous cases,
failed to notice their problematic character.
Moreover, Clackamas does not merely fail to expose the flaws in the
defense arguments. Rather, the Court to varying degrees positively en-
dorsed some of the faulty premises on which those arguments rest. The
Court either tacitly or explicitly approved of the propositions that being
an owner and a manager makes one an employer271 and that employers
cannot be employees, 272 as well as certain related EEOC guidelines
factors. 273
At the same time, however, the Court adopted the common law of
agency as the governing standard, 274 and common law agency principles
are flatly inconsistent with the defense arguments. Clackamas therefore
imposes a paradox on the lower federal courts as well as on state courts
applying federal employment discrimination law: All of those courts are
bound by Clackamas, but it is literally impossible to comply with Clacka-
mas in its entirety. The federal and state courts consequently have no
tion suit, then the individual is not a proper plaintiff to bring such a suit. Drescher, 280
F.3d at 204. But discrimination suits do not always deal with employment policies, and
even though a dominant manager surely has the right to control subordinate employees'
conduct, the manager might in fact fail, through no fault of his or her own, to prevent
discriminatory conduct before it happens. Indeed, every employee of any employer cov-
ered by the employment discrimination statutes has the right to a discrimination-free work-
place, but that does not always prevent discriminatory conduct from happening.
For example, a woman who is the president, sole director, and sole shareholder of a
medical professional corporation might, through no fault of her own, be the victim of inap-
propriate touching or other sexual harassment by another doctor employed by the corpora-
tion. The president would have at her disposal various means of self-help, such as firing or
otherwise disciplining the offending employee, and it is unlikely that she would have any
interest in suing the corporation of which she was the sole owner. Nonetheless, if for some
reason she did want to sue-if, for example, the dignitary value of judicial vindication of
her rights was important to her, and the corporation had an insurance policy that would
pay for any adverse judgment-then it is hard to see why she should be absolutely prohib-
ited from suing. And it is still harder to see why the oddity or improbability of such a suit
should prohibit subordinate employees-like the plaintiff in Drescher, who was a secre-
tary-from obtaining the only form of redress available to them. Cf. Clackamas, 538 U.S.
at 454-55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he character of the relationship between [the pro-
fessional corporation] and the doctors supplies no justification for withholding from cleri-
cal worker Wells federal protection against discrimination in the workplace . . .
271. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450.
272. Id. at 445 n.5.
273. Id. at 449-50; see also supra note 227.
274. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445.
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alternative but to choose which parts of Clackamas they will follow and
which parts they will disregard as nonbinding dicta.
The central and unambiguous holding of Clackamas is that, as in Reid
and Darden, the legislature's failure to provide a meaningful definition of
the statutory term "employee" means that the common law definition
governs.275 Consequently, no court that follows common law doctrine in
making employee status determinations under federal antidiscrimination
law can be faulted for defying Clackamas. Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine a more sound interpretive approach to the puzzle Clackamas
presents.
As the analytical framework developed in this Article shows, careful
attention to the common law turns out to be employment discrimination
defendants' worst enemy. If courts decide to follow Clackamas by rigor-
ously applying common law doctrine, they will ultimately transform the
employment defense bar's qualified victory in Clackamas into a resound-
ing defeat.
275. See id.; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992);
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989).
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